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Subsidizing Gentrification: A Spatial 
Analysis of Place-Based Tax Incentives 
Michelle D. Layser* 
Place-based tax incentives, such as the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and 
Opportunity Zones incentives, are often used to promote investment in low-income 
neighborhoods. However, not all low-income neighborhoods have an equal need for investment 
subsidies. Subsidies for investment in already gentrifying neighborhoods, for example, may 
reflect inefficient inframarginal investment, and they may lead to inequitable outcomes. Critics 
fear that when gentrifying neighborhoods are eligible for tax incentives, they will draw 
investment away from the neighborhoods that need it most. However, few studies have provided 
empirical analysis to assess whether these concerns have merit. Through a novel geospatial 
analysis of the location patterns of tax-subsidized projects, this Article provides new evidence 
that critics’ concerns are justified. 
This Article analyzes fifteen years of NMTC data to explore the location patterns of 
tax-subsidized projects in twenty U.S. cities. It employs two spatial analysis methods, quadrat 
density analysis and negative binomial regression analysis, to describe the location patterns of 
NMTC projects and their relationship to two variables known to correlate with  
gentrification: high vacancy rates and increasing rental rates. The quadrat density analysis 
reveals that, in most cities, NMTC project density is highest in eligible census tracts that had 
high vacancy rates, increasing rents, or both. The results of the negative binomial regression 
analysis confirmed that, in many cities, high vacancy rates or rent increases were statistically 
significant predictors of NMTC investment. Together, these results provide new evidence that 
gentrifying census tracts may draw tax-subsidized investment away from other eligible areas. 
They also suggest that a commonly proposed Opportunity Zones reform—to add statutory 
safeguards modeled after those in the NMTC—would fail to prevent tax-subsidized 
investment in places that are already gentrifying. 
The observed spatial patterns reflect inefficient allocations, limit the NMTC program’s 
ability to promote equitable change, and cast doubt about whether federal regulators can 
 
* Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. Versions of this draft were presented at the 
UC Irvine Tax Policy Workshop, the Chicagoland Junior Scholars Works-In-Progress Conference, the 
2020 Junior Tax Conference, and the University of Toronto Tax Policy Colloquium. This Article has 
benefited from thoughtful comments from Professors Alexander Boni-Saenz, Ted De Barbieri, Victor 
Fleischer, Rory Gillis, Victoria Haneman, Tracy Kaye, Alexander Lemann, Zachary Liscow, and Blaine 
Saito. This project would not have been possible without research assistance from Wataru Morioka, 
Geography Ph.D. Candidate, University of Illinois. Any mistakes are my own. 
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effectively shape program outcomes. Opportunity Zones are likely to have similarly inefficient 
and inequitable outcomes. Therefore, this Article argues that statutory and administrative 
reforms are necessary to reduce the frequency at which tax incentives are used to subsidize 
investment in neighborhoods that are already gentrifying. This study has profound implications 
for the five-billion-dollar-per-year federal NMTC program, the $3.5 billion per year federal 
Opportunity Zones program, and state-level tax incentives modeled after these federal  
tax laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the new Opportunity Zones1 tax incentive was created by the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act of 2017,2 it was touted by members of both political parties as a tool 
to lift up struggling communities by promoting investment in low-income 
neighborhoods.3 State governors acted quickly to designate 8,764 census tracts as 
 
1. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1. 
2. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
3. Siri Bulusu, How a Tax Perk Can Turn a Paper Mill into a Fish Farm (Podcast), BLOOMBERG 
TAX (May 10, 2019, 1:45 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/how-a-tax-perk-can-
turn-a-paper-mill-into-a-fish-farm-podcast [https://perma.cc/9JVL-LCMK]. 
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tax-favored Opportunity Zones.4 Tract eligibility was restricted by statute, and for 
the most part, governors selected tracts with lower income, higher poverty rates, 
and higher unemployment than those that were not selected.5 However, the law has 
drawn criticism for targeting investment to neighborhoods that were  
already gentrifying.6 
Take, for example, Philadelphia. In that city, the census tracts designated as 
Opportunity Zones showed “greater signs of economic distress” than eligible tracts 
that were not chosen.7 At the same time, officials also “selected a higher proportion 
of gentrifying tracts for the program than any other major city.”8 Critics fear that 
the designation of gentrifying census tracts like these may undermine program 
objectives by attracting investment away from the areas that need it most.9 In other 
words, “the program’s usefulness will be undermined if investment is concentrated 
in already-gentrifying areas at the expense of other designated tracts.”10 
Yet, no existing study has provided empirical analysis to assess whether these 
concerns have merit. A significant body of research examines the amount and types 
 
4. OPPORTUNITY ZONES, https://opportunityzones.hud.gov [https://perma.cc/PS7F-
XE9P] ( last visited May 12, 2020) 
5. Ofer Eldar & Chelsea Garber, Does Government Play Favorites? Evidence from Opportunity 






6. According to one study, gentrifying census tracts had a nineteen percent chance of receiving 
Opportunity Zone designation. Jacob Adelman, Philly’s ‘Opportunity Zone’ Tracts Are Some of the City’s 
Poorest, and Among Its Biggest Gentrifiers, Fed Finds, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 15, 2019),  
https://www.inquirer.com/real-estate/commercial/opportunity-zones-philadelphia-federal-reserve-
gentrification-poverty-development-20191115.html [https://perma.cc/HF2V-S7BF]; Kelsi Maree 
Borland, Many Opportunity Zones Are Already Gentrified, GLOBEST.COM (Feb. 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.globest.com/2019/02/14/many-opportunity-zones-are-already-gentrified/ [https:// 
perma.cc/MSM2-7DA9]. Other designations that have drawn critique include wealthy census tracts 
that were mistakenly designated due to mapping errors and tracts on college campuses where the 
presence of students skewed census survey results. Trump, Inc., An Opportunity for the Rich, WNYC 
STUDIOS ( June 19, 2019), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/trumpinc/episodes/trump-inc-
opportunity-for-rich [https://perma.cc/W6FY-TP6Q]; Tom Kacich, That’s Rich: Housing Scheme Cuts 
Out Poor, NEWS-GAZETTE (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.news-gazette.com/news/tom-kacich-that-
s-rich-housing-scheme-cuts-out-poor/article_b179355a-f47c-536a-ac1c-ebf2ba059115.html  [https:// 
perma.cc/XXJ6-65ZU]. 
7. Adelman, supra note 6. 
8. Id. 
9. Id.; see also Kathryn Kranhold, There’s No Evidence That Opportunity Zones Benefit Low-Income 
Residents and Their Neighborhoods, MOTHER JONES (June 29, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2020/06/theres-no-evidence-that-opportunity-zones-benefit-low-income-residents-and-their 
-neighborhoods/ [https://perma.cc/7KW2-VUWC] (noting that critics argue that places where 
development was already dynamic do not need incentives for redevelopment and describing gentrifying 
areas as places that have improperly received Opportunity Zones support). 
10. Adelman, supra note 6. 
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of investments that take place in response to tax incentives,11 but few studies have 
analyzed where investments are made within tax-favored zones.12 If all eligible tracts 
are equally likely to attract investment, then the presence of a small number of 
gentrifying census tracts may not significantly affect program outcomes. On the 
other hand, if gentrifying tracts attract a disproportionate share of investment, then 
those designations may undermine program goals. 
Data about the locations of Opportunity Zones investment is not yet available 
due to the law’s recent enactment, and the failure of the law to require robust 
reporting requirements may prevent researchers from accessing such information 
for the foreseeable future.13 However, important insights can be gained from 
studying a more established tax incentive—the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC).14 
The NMTC was recently expanded in December 2020 by the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act to provide five billion dollars per year in tax credits for 
investment in low-income communities.15 
Among the existing tax incentives used to promote economic development, 
the NMTC is most structurally analogous to the Opportunity Zones incentive.16 
For this reason, it is likely that a study of NMTC investment patterns would be 
generalizable to Opportunity Zones. That is, if NMTC investment 
disproportionately flows to gentrifying areas, the same pattern is likely to result in 
the context of Opportunity Zones. In addition, such results would suggest that a 
common reform proposal—to add safeguards to the Opportunity Zones law 
 
11. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-334, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: THE 
CREDIT HELPS FUND A VARIETY OF PROJECTS IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES, BUT COULD BE 
SIMPLIFIED (2010); Tami Gurley-Calvez, Thomas J. Gilbert, Katherine Harper, Donald J. Marples  
& Kevin Daly, Do Tax Incentives Affect Investment?: An Analysis of the New Markets Tax Credit, 37 
PUB. FIN. REV. 371 (2009); Kaitlyn Harger & Amanda Ross, Do Capital Tax Incentives Attract New 
Businesses? Evidence Across Industries from the New Markets Tax Credit, 56 J. REG’L SCI. 733 (2016); 
Richard C. Hula & Marty P. Jordan, Private Investment and Public Redevelopment: The Case of New 
Markets Tax Credits, 10 POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 11 (2018). 
12. To the author’s knowledge, the only study of this topic is an unpublished dissertation that 
analyzes the relationship between New Markets Tax Credit and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit siting 
patterns. Michael Henderson, The Locational Patterns and Socioeconomic Effects of the New Markets 
Tax Credit and Low Income Housing Tax Credit in Distressed Metropolitan Census Tracts (Apr. 30, 
2018) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgia State University) (https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss/
71/  [https://perma.cc/GTG6-FB9R]). 
13. Rebecca Lester, Cody Evans & Hanna Tian, Opportunity Zones: An Analysis of the Policy’s 
Implications, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 221, 226–28, 230–31 (2018) (noting that increased reporting would 
help researchers and using New Markets Tax Credit data to help inform an analysis of  
Opportunity Zones). 
14. I.R.C. § 45D. 
15. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 112 (2020);  
I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(H) (West); see also Martha Groves Pugh & Brian Moore, NMTC Extended Through 
2025 with $5 Billion Annual Appropriations, NAT’L L. REV. ( Jan. 7, 2021),  
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/nmtc-extended-through-2025-5-billion-annual-appropriations 
[https://perma.cc/ENR9-J5EC]. 
16. Michelle D. Layser, A Typology of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives, 25 WASH. & LEE  
J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 403, 449 (2019); Lester et al., supra note 13, at 226. 
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modeled after those contained in the NMTC—would be insufficient to prevent  
tax-subsidized investment in places that are gentrifying. 
For these reasons, this Article analyzes fifteen years of NMTC data to explore 
location patterns of tax-subsidized investments in twenty U.S. cities. Specifically, 
this study asks whether NMTC allocations have disproportionately flowed to 
eligible census tracts that exhibit signs of gentrification. This study employs spatial 
analysis methods to describe the spatial patterns of investment and their relationship 
to two variables known to correlate with gentrification: high vacancy rates and 
increasing rental rates.17 Through this analysis, this Article provides new evidence 
that NMTC subsidies have flowed disproportionately to eligible census tracts that 
exhibit signs of gentrification. 
This Article makes several important contributions to the tax, empirical, and 
urban law literatures. First, it contributes to the tax policy literature by providing 
new, empirically grounded insights about taxpayer behavior that are essential to 
inform the design of effective and impactful place-based tax incentives.18 Second, it 
contributes to the empirical literature about taxation by extending spatial analysis 
methods, which have more frequently been employed by geographers, to the study 
of taxation. Third, it contributes to the urban law literature by providing new 
insights about the role of tax incentives within broader urban redevelopment  
policy debates. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the history of redevelopment 
policies, state-led gentrification efforts, and the role of tax incentives in urban 
redevelopment. It situates place-based tax incentives within larger debates about 
urban redevelopment. Notably, place-based tax incentives are poised to take on 
increased importance in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis as cities seek to 
revitalize their economies through new economic development.19 This section 
argues that the impact of tax incentives like the NMTC and Opportunity Zones law 
will partially turn on whether they promote investment in gentrifying 
neighborhoods or whether investment is more broadly distributed. 
Part II sets forth a spatial analysis of NMTC investment patterns to 
demonstrate that tax-subsidized investment has disproportionately flowed to areas 
that exhibit strong signs of gentrification. Focusing on two variables with known 
 
17. For a discussion of variable selection, see Section II.A. 
18. The phrase “place-based tax incentive” is often used to describe spatially differentiated tax 
laws, including those used to drive investment to low-income areas. Michelle Layser, How Place-Based 






19. Michael Novogradac, Community Development Tax Incentives Poised to Help Spur  
COVID-19 Recovery, NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, May 1, 2020, at 4. 
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positive correlations to gentrification—high vacancy rates and rent increases—the 
analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I perform a quadrat density analysis to describe 
the spatial distribution of NMTC projects in twenty cities. This analysis shows that 
project density is consistently highest in eligible census tracts with higher vacancy 
rates and higher rent increases than in other eligible tracts. 
Second, I employ a negative binomial regression analysis to gain further insight 
into the relationship between the key variables and project density, controlling for 
additional variables such as racial composition and income levels. Again, this 
analysis demonstrates that, in many—but not all—cities, NMTC allocations 
increase as a function of increasing vacancy rates and increasing rents. Together, 
these analyses present new and surprising evidence that NMTC allocations have 
flowed to census tracts that exhibit signs of gentrification. 
Part III discusses the policy implications of the empirical analysis. It argues 
that the observed spatial patterns reflect inefficient allocations, limit the program’s 
ability to promote equitable change, and cast doubt about whether federal regulators 
can effectively shape program outcomes. Specifically, these patterns suggest that 
the NMTC has resulted in wasteful tax expenditures in gentrifying locations, while 
also undermining equity within the tax system and failing to benefit the low-income 
communities with the most need. In addition, variation in results across cities raises 
new questions about the role of federal regulators in tax incentive administration, 
as well as the wisdom of state-level tax incentives modeled after these  
federal programs. 
Finally, these results have particularly troublesome implications for 
Opportunity Zones. For reasons to be explained, the patterns observed in this study 
are likely to be even more pronounced in the context of Opportunity Zones, which 
lack many of the safeguards included in the NMTC. For this reason, this Article 
argues that both laws should require active regulation that includes an evaluation of 
proposed project locations. Projects located in areas that are already gentrifying 
should be ineligible for tax-subsidized investment under both laws unless the 
project actively serves low-income residents. Failure to implement such reforms will 
result in wasteful and inequitable outcomes that reinforce structural inequality. 
I. PLACE-BASED TAX INCENTIVES AND GENTRIFICATION 
A. Gentrification and Urban Redevelopment 
Like other redevelopment tools, tax incentives are often used to promote the 
redevelopment of distressed neighborhoods.20 There are many reasons why 
government intervention in distressed neighborhoods may be desirable. The 
presence of abandoned properties may create “fire hazards as well as health and 
safety hazards, which can quickly become infested with rodents, sites for illegal 
 
20. See Layser, supra note 18, at 10−12 (describing a shift toward tax-based approaches to 
support affordable housing and community development). 
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dumping, harbors for criminal activities, or places for vagrants to live.”21 A dearth 
of employers in the area may create “spatial mismatch,” whereby distance from jobs 
creates a barrier to employment, contributing to persistent unemployment and 
poverty.22 Displacement of residents due to poor housing quality may threaten 
social networks, leading to less resilient communities that are more dependent on 
government safety nets.23 Meanwhile, rehabilitation of the built environment has 
been linked to a variety of social benefits, including crime reduction and improved 
health outcomes.24 
For reasons like these, federal and state governments spend billions of dollars 
each year in subsidies aimed to encourage investment in distressed areas. These 
subsidies are increasingly delivered through tax incentives.25 From 2005 to 2019, the 
annual cost of federal tax expenditures for economic development increased by $3.2 
billion.26 For example, the size of the federal New Markets Tax Credit, which has 
been used to subsidize redevelopment since 2000, has steadily increased over time 
and now provides for five billion dollars of tax credit annually.27 The Opportunity 
Zones law is estimated to cost the federal government $3.5 billion in capital gains 
 
21. Victoria Chaney Morckel, Empty Neighborhoods: Using Constructs to Predict the Probability 
of Housing Abandonment, 23 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 469, 469 (2013). 
22. Christina Stacy, Brady Meixell & Serena Lei, Too Far from Jobs: Spatial Mismatch and Hourly 
Workers, URB. INST. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.urban.org/features/too-far-jobs-spatial-mismatch-
and-hourly-workers [https://perma.cc/3NX5-8LVR]. 
23. See generally MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN 
CITY (2016) (describing the relationships between poor housing quality, evictions, and the detrimental 
impact that loss of housing has on low-income communities); Miriam Zuk, Ariel H. Bierbaum, Karen 
Chapple, Karolina Gorska & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Gentrification, Displacement, and the Role of 
Public Investment, 33 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 31, 35 (2018) (explaining that displacement often occurs 
due to poor housing quality). 
24. Charles C. Branas, Eugenia South, Michelle C. Kondo, Bernadette C. Hohl, Philippe 
Bourgois, Douglas J. Wiebe & John M. MacDonald, Citywide Cluster Randomized Trial to Restore 
Blighted Vacant Land and Its Effects on Violence, Crime, and Fear, 115 PROC. NAT’L  
ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 2946, 2950 (2018); Erica Raleigh & George Galster, Neighborhood Disinvestment, 
Abandonment, and Crime Dynamics, 37 J. URB. AFFS. 367, 389 (2015); Hilary Thomson, Mark Petticrew 
& David Morrison, Health Effects of Housing Improvement: Systematic Review of Intervention Studies, 323 
BRIT. MED. J. 187, 188 (2001) (linking rehabilitation to improved health outcomes). 
25. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005–2009, at 35 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2005) (estimating the 
following $1.6 billion of tax expenditures in 2005: $0.4 billion for New Markets Tax Credit; $0.7 billion 
for Empowerment Zone Tax Credit; $0.5 billion for Renewal Community Tax Incentive); STAFF OF 
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023, at 26 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2019) (estimating the following $4.8 billion of tax 
expenditures in 2019: $1.3 billion for New Markets Tax Credit; $3.5 billion for Qualified Opportunity 
Zones), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5238 [https://perma.cc/ 
4WUQ-VMNJ]. 
26. Id. 
27. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 112 (2020);  
I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(H). 
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relief each year through 2022.28 These federal tax incentive programs also have state 
and local counterparts, whereby state and local governments fund similar incentives 
to supplement the federal redevelopment initiatives.29 
Meanwhile, urban redevelopment in the United States is inextricably linked to 
debates about gentrification. Gentrification refers to “the process by which decline 
and disinvestments in inner-city neighborhoods are reversed.”30 There is no 
established definition for gentrification, but at its core, the term describes 
neighborhoods in transition from a low-income neighborhood to a higher income 
neighborhood.31 To many, the term also connotes racial transition, whereby 
neighborhoods with significant Black or Brown populations turn over to majority 
white populations.32 
Though many anti-poverty advocates reflexively oppose gentrification, in the 
academic literature, “[d]epending on the time and place, gentrification has been seen 
as a tool, goal, outcome, or unintended consequence of revitalization processes in 
declining urban neighborhoods, which are defined by their physical deterioration, 
concentrations of poverty, and racial segregation of people of color.”33 Since an 
objective of urban redevelopment is to achieve neighborhood improvements by 
rehabilitating the built environment and spurring new economic activity, 
gentrification may be viewed as either a goal or a risk of urban redevelopment. 
As urban law professor Nestor Davidson explains, “every public investment 
in a given place not only has a direct impact on the people in that place but more 
importantly shapes the incentives that people have to remain, leave, avoid, or move 
to that place.”34 The process by which mobile residents move to achieve their 
preferred mix of taxes and amenities is called “Tiebout sorting.”35 If Tiebout sorting 
occurs, then one would expect that any successful urban development program that 
 
28. Samantha Jacoby, Final Opportunity Zone Rules Could Raise Tax Break’s Cost, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 3, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/final-
opportunity-zone-rules-could-raise-tax-breaks-cost [https://perma.cc/E4XD-5BVR]. 
29. State NMTC Programs, NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/
new-markets-tax-credits/application-allocation/state-nmtc-programs ( last visited Oct. 5, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/3TV4-XBWP]; State Tax Code Conformity – Personal Income, NOVOGRADAC, 
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zone-resource-center/guidance/state-tax-
code-conformity-personal-income ( last visited Oct. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/A2JL-8XUD]. 
30. Lance Freeman, Displacement or Succession?: Residential Mobility in Gentrifying 
Neighborhoods, 40 URB. AFFS. REV. 463, 463 (2005). 
31. Ryun Jung Lee & Galen Newman, The Relationship Between Vacant Properties and 
Neighborhood Gentrification, LAND USE POL’Y, Feb. 2021, at 1, 1. 
32. Jen Douglas, From Disinvestment to Displacement: Gentrification and Jamaica Plain’s  
Hyde-Jackson Squares, 23 TROTTER REV. 1, 13–14 (2016). But see Daniel J. Hammel & Elvin K. Wyly, 
A Model for Identifying Gentrified Areas with Census Data, 17 URB. GEOGRAPHY 248, 264 (1996) 
(choosing not to include racial transition in a model to predict gentrification from census data). 
33. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 32. 
34. Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and Community Development 
Policy, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2009). 
35. Id. at 8. 
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results in meaningful neighborhood improvements would attract new residents to 
the area.36 
Some commonly stated goals of urban redevelopment policies—such as 
growing the local tax base or achieving socioeconomic and racial integration—seem 
to assume that gentrification and Tiebout sorting will occur.37 Arguably, the 
purpose of urban development is to expand the amenities available in distressed 
neighborhoods, thereby making those neighborhoods more attractive places for 
people to live and work.38 Alternatively, gentrification may be viewed as a risk  
of—or a constraint on—successful urban development initiatives. For example, 
urban green space strategies to advance social equity “may be paradoxical, in that 
the creation of green space to facilitate real estate can ultimately lead to 
gentrification and the displacement of various residents, thus alleviating social 
inequity by benefiting citizens unequally and pricing out vulnerable residents.”39 
B. Tax Incentives and Urban Redevelopment 
1. From Slum Clearance to Enterprise Zones 
Today’s largest place-based tax incentives, the New Markets Tax Credit and 
Opportunity Zones laws, grew out of a long history of government policies that 
have supported gentrification—intentionally or not—by directing public and 
private capital toward some neighborhoods and away from others.40 Researchers 
have noted that “[s]tate policies may amplify already existing gentrification 
processes, or alternatively seek to spark gentrification in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods.”41 Some of the first examples of systematic, state-assisted 
gentrification were introduced by the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954.42 Under 
these laws, the “federal government provided direct grants, and state governments 
 
36. See generally David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 
YALE L.J. 78 (2017) (describing lower than expected rates of mobility and legal barriers to  
interstate mobility). 
37. See Jason M. Knight & Mohammad Gharipour, Urban Displacement and Low-Income 
Communities: The Case of the American City from the Late Twentieth Century, INT’L J. ARCHITECTURAL 
RSCH., July 2016, at 6, 14–16. 
38. See Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 32. 
39. Mengbing Du & Xiaoling Zhang, Urban Greening: A New Paradox of Economic or Social 
Sustainability?, LAND USE POL’Y, Mar. 2020, at 1, 9. 
40. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 32. 
41. Cody Hochstenbach, State-Led Gentrification and the Changing Geography of  
Market-Oriented Housing Policies, 34 HOUS., THEORY & SOC’Y 399, 400 (2017). 
42. See Norma Nager, Continuities of Urban Policy on the Poor: From Urban Renewal to 
Reinvestment, in BACK TO THE CITY: ISSUES IN NEIGHBORHOOD RENOVATION 239, 242 (Shirley 
Bradway Laska & Daphne Spain eds., 1980); Jason Hackworth & Neil Smith, The Changing State of 
Gentrification, 92 J. ECON. & HUM. GEOGRAPHY 464, 466 (2001) (“Systematic gentrification dates back 
only to the 1950s . . . .”); Neil Smith, Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by 
Capital, Not People, 45 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 538, 546 (1979) (describing the state’s role in early 
gentrification schemes, in which the state assembled properties at fair market value and sold to 
developers at lower assessed prices). 
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aggressively assisted their corporate-led local urban renewal authorities in 
gentrification by ‘assembling properties at fair market value and returning them to 
developers at the lower assessed price.’”43 
These early urban renewal policies relied heavily on slum clearance, which 
inflicted significant harm on low-income communities through widespread 
displacement of residents.44 As of June 30, 1966, over 400,000 units had been 
cleared (or scheduled for clearance), “forcing the relocation of over 300,000 
families.”45 For this reason, “urban renewal became synonymous with a clearance 
project of any sort.”46 Moreover, the disproportionate numbers of minorities 
affected by these policies led some critics to argue that “urban renewal really meant 
[Black] removal,”47 which was often accomplished by constructing  
interstate highways.48 
For example, in Hamtramck, Michigan, the city’s 1959 master plan “called for 
a ‘program of population loss,’ understood to refer to its small number of African 
American residents.”49 Pursuant to this plan, the city used federal urban renewal 
funds to “demolish African American neighborhoods,” clearing land for the 
expansion of a Chrysler automobile manufacturing plant and the Chrysler 
Expressway (I-75).50 In Miami, Florida, a similar highway project was used to reduce 
“a community of 40,000 African Americans to 8,000,” and in Camden, New Jersey, 
interstate highway projects “destroyed some 3,000 low-income housing units from 
1963 to 1967.”51 In Los Angeles, the “routing of the Santa Monica Freeway in 1954 
destroyed the city’s most prosperous Black middle class area, Sugar Hill.”52 
Frustration over the destruction caused by these policies “provoked a political 
revolt against ‘urban renewal,’”53 which became a flash point in the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s.54 Ultimately, the urban renewal program was terminated 
in 1974.55 After the early urban renewal program was discontinued, subsequent 
urban redevelopment strategies relied on public-private partnerships and, 
increasingly, indirect support for gentrification through tax incentives.56 
 
43. Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 
and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, WIS. L. REV. 745, 776 (2019). 
44. William J. Collins & Katharine L. Shester, Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal in the United 
States, 5 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 239, 241–42 (2013). 
45. Id. 
46. Alexander von Hoffman, The Lost History of Urban Renewal, in THE AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING READER 14, 25 ( J. Rosie Tighe & Elizabeth J. Mueller eds., 2013). 
47. Id. at 26. 
48. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 127 (2017). 
49. Id. at 128. 
50. Id. at 128–29. 
51. Id. at 129. 
52. Id. at 130. 
53. von Hoffman, supra note 46, at 26. 
54. Layser supra note 43, at 777. 
55. Id. at 778. 
56. Id. 
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Among the earliest examples of tax incentives used to support urban 
redevelopment were state enterprise zone laws.57 States began introducing versions 
of enterprise zone laws in 1981, and “by the early 1990s, thirty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia had adopted their own enterprise zone legislation.”58 Under 
the typical enterprise zone statute, government leaders designated census tracts as 
tax-favored zones.59 Though states emphasize different zone designation criteria, 
most include some combination of poverty rate and unemployment rate thresholds 
among the relevant factors.60 
The laws generally provide for tax relief (e.g., hiring or investment tax credits, 
capital gains relief, sales tax exemptions, or property tax abatements) and regulatory 
relief (e.g., relaxed permit requirements) for businesses that are located within the 
zones.61 The tax-based subsidies provide a boost to businesses in enterprise zones 
and an incentive for businesses to locate in (or shift to) the zones.62 However, these 
subsidies do not provide for the large capital infusions typically needed to fuel new 
real estate construction or rehabilitation.63 
A federal version of enterprise zone laws was passed by the Clinton 
Administration in 1993.64 The new tax law created nine “empowerment zones” and 
ninety-five “enterprise communities.”65 Although the enterprise zone concept had 
long been popular among conservatives, Clinton’s version drew criticism from 
conservative circles. Republican Congressman Jack Kemp, one of the earliest 
proponents of the enterprise zone approach, “called Clinton’s plan ‘anemic’ and 
‘anti-capitalistic’” and criticized the incentives as “weak and incomplete, with 
virtually no incentives to encourage entrepreneurs or small businesses.”66 The 
Heritage Foundation strategist who first brought the enterprise zone idea from 
Great Britain called the program “worse than nothing.”67 
The law also drew criticism from within Clinton’s own party. Democrat 
Senator Joseph Lieberman argued that the law offered “excessive benefits for the 
nine empowerment zones and a lack of capital incentives.”68 For these reasons,  
Sen. Lieberman proposed the creation of “enterprise zone development funds,” 
which would enable larger subsidies to flow into the zones.69 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 780. 
59. Layser, supra note 16, at 416. 
60. Id. at 422 n.83. 
61. Id. at 417. 
62. Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (1993). 
63. Layser, supra note 16, at 417. 
64. I.R.C. § 1391; Jeffrey M. Euston, Clinton’s Empowerment Zones: Hope for the Cities or a 
Failing Enterprise?, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 140, 140 (1994). 
65. I.R.C. § 1391. 
66. Euston, supra note 64, at 140. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 146. 
69. Id. 
Clean Final Edit_Layser_V2.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:16 AM 
2021] SUBSIDIZING GENTRIFICATION 175 
Under the proposal, enterprise zone development funds would be “specialized 
investment funds that would direct investment exclusively in enterprise zones.”70 
They would be closed-end funds and tradeable on stock exchanges, and they “would 
permit investors to defer the tax on gains realized from sales of securities and other 
capital assets to the extent that they used the proceeds to acquire shares of the 
funds.”71 (Lieberman’s proposal never became law, but its parallels to the 
Opportunity Zones law introduced in 2017 are undeniable.) Though enterprise zone 
development funds were not adopted, another federal tax incentive was enacted in 
2000 for the same general purpose of driving large infusions of capital to  
low-income areas: the New Markets Tax Credit.72 
2. Tax Incentives for Debt and Equity Investment 
a. New Markets Tax Credit 
New Markets Tax Credits (NMTCs) are tax credits claimed by investors who 
contribute capital to Community Development Entities (CDEs), which in turn 
invest in projects located in eligible low-income census tracts.73 The NMTC statute 
currently authorizes five billion dollars in tax credits to be allocated to CDEs 
nationwide.74 These tax credits are awarded pursuant to a competitive application 
process administered by the Community Development Financial Institutions 
(CDFI) Fund, which is an office within the Department of the Treasury.75 Each 
year, CDEs apply to the CDFI Fund for NMTC allocations.76 
After the CDFI Fund allocates the tax credits to a CDE, the CDE solicits 
investors, which are almost always large financial institutions, to make so-called 
qualifying equity investments in the CDE.77 In exchange for that investment, the 
 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 147. The NMTC was introduced in Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000,  
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, with a total of $15bil authorized for allocation from 2001 to 2007; 
extended by Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 
which extended authorization through 2019 at $3.5 bil/year. 
72. DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34402, NEW MARKETS 
TAX CREDIT: AN INTRODUCTION NOTE 1 (2016). 
73. I.R.C. § 45D(e); Roger M. Groves, The De-Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits, 8 
FLA. TAX REV. 213, 220 (2007). To be eligible, census tracts generally must have a poverty rate of 
twenty percent or higher. Id. 
74. I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(G). 
75. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 1. 
76. See generally CDFI FUND, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT 
PROGRAM: ALLOCATION APPLICATION FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2020) (describing the 
NMTC application process). 
77. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 2–3. Investors generally do not expect significant 
market returns on these investments. HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, NEW MARKET TAX CREDIT BASICS 
3 (2013), http://services.housingonline.com/nhra_images/NMTC%20Basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3KGP-7YR4]. Rather, they expect to profit primarily from the use of tax credits, which the CDE is 
authorized to pass along to investors. Id. To achieve this result, investors size their capital contributions 
according to the value of tax credits that they expect to receive in connection with the investment. Id. 
According to the Congressional Research Service, the “tax credit markets historically set a price of 70 
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CDE promises to pass the NMTCs along to the investors, who will claim the tax 
credits on their tax returns.78 The CDE then uses the newly raised capital to make 
capital contributions to developers or businesses in the tax-favored zones.79 In 
practice, these contributions are called “Qualified Low-Income Community 
Investments” (QLICIs), and they almost always take the form of debt.80 The basic 
transaction structure is summarized in the diagram below. 
 
Through this structure, the NMTC helps provide large infusions of capital into 
projects, helping to support new construction, rehabilitation, and large development 
projects, among others.81 An analysis of all NMTC allocations made through 2019 
reveals that the average QLICI equaled 73.6% of estimated project costs, with the 
median QLICI covering 84.56% of estimated project costs.82 For the 39.8% of 
projects that were real estate transactions, the average QLICI equaled 68.1% of 
project costs, and the median QLICI covered 75.7%.83 These QLICIs, which are 
 
to 80 cents per dollar of tax credit,” with lower valuation in years when credit markets are tight and 
corporate profits are small. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 7. This result is achieved using 
leveraged structures. In a basic transaction, the tax equity investor and a debt lender will contribute to 
an investor-owned fund that, in turn, makes a qualified equity investment in the CDE. For example, a 
tax equity investor may contribute 31 cents of every dollar, while the lender provides 69 cents of every 
dollar. Every dollar of qualified equity investments generates 39 cents, the entire amount of which is 
passed to the tax equity investor. In this way, the tax equity investor is able to generate a larger return 
on its investment. 
78. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 3. 
79. Id. 
80. Id; see also John Sciarretti, Michael Novogradac & Peter Lawrence, New Opportunity Zones 
Could be Used to Finance Rental Housing, NOVOGRADAC (Feb. 23, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://
www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/new-opportunity-zones-could-be-used-finance-rental-
housing  [https://perma.cc/QF8V-KNJW] (noting that “business investments under the NMTC 
program are almost always debt”). 
81. Layser, supra note 43, at 768. 
82. Data on file with author. 
83. Data on file with author. 
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provided to real estate developers in the form of loans, are subsidized through the 
tax credit program.84 
The NMTC has been criticized for failing to ensure that benefits flow to 
residents of low-income communities.85 Because the statute places few restrictions 
on the types of projects that can be supported through the program,86 it has been 
used to subsidize projects like museums and opera houses that are not well targeted 
to benefit poor residents.87 Meanwhile, the census tract eligibility criteria permit a 
significant proportion of census tracts to qualify for NMTC financing in many 
cities.88 Inevitably, the pool of eligible census tract includes gentrifying 
neighborhoods, and the NMTC has the potential to subsidize further investment in 
those areas. For reasons like these, critics have long called for the  
“de-gentrification” of the NMTC,89 though limited research has explored the 
relationship between the NMTC and gentrification empirically.90 
b. Opportunity Zones 
Despite the relatively large infusions of capital provided by the NMTC, many 
community development industry participants consider the tax credit to be a 
relatively small subsidy compared to project costs, particularly in the context of real 
estate development.91 Since the NMTC is a debt-subsidy, it typically is not the lead 
source of project financing.92 For this reason, some community development 
industry participants saw a continued need for a subsidy for equity investment in 
low-income areas.93 The new Opportunity Zones tax incentive introduced in the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 filled this gap. 
Under the law, state governors chose from a pool of eligible census  
tracts—roughly defined as NMTC-eligible tracts, Empowerment Zones, and 
certain contiguous census tracts—to designate 8,764 census tracts as Opportunity 
 
84. See John Sciarretti & George Barlow, Pairing NMTCs with Opportunity Zone Incentives, 9 
NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, April 2018, at 2, https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/articles/
pairing-nmtcs-opportunity-zone-incentives [https://perma.cc/YDK9-3JLT] (explaining that NMTCs 
are generally used to subsidize loans to qualified active low-income businesses). 
85. Groves, supra note 73, at 223. 
86. I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(a). 
87. Groves, supra note 73, at 216. 
88. See I.R.C. § 45D(e). For example, in Chicago 527 out of 808 census tracts (65%) were eligible 
for NMTC allocations in 2018. Data on file with author. 
89. Groves, supra note 73, at 216. 
90. Henderson, supra note 12, at 101–21. 
91. Democracy Collaborative, Policy Guide: New Markets Tax Credit,  
COMMUNITY-WEALTH.ORG, https://community-wealth.org/strategies/policy-guide/nmtc.html 
[https://perma.cc/C2FF-6GDW] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021). 
92. Id. 
93. See Bulusu, supra note 3 (describing the ways that Opportunity Zones incentives were 
envisioned to supplement earlier incentives like the New Markets Tax Credit). 
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Zones.94 The law provides tax benefits to individual or institutional investors who 
make eligible investments in so-called Opportunity Funds that make equity 
investments in the designated Opportunity Zones.95 In this way, the Opportunity 
Zones law enables large capital infusions like the NMTC. But unlike the NMTC, 
which is used to provide debt capital to qualifying businesses, the Opportunity 
Zones law promotes equity capital investment in low-income communities.96 By 
providing tax benefits to third-party investors, the law provides a significant boost 
to downstream businesses by enabling them to attract equity capital that may 
otherwise be unavailable.97 
The low-income tracts that were designated as Opportunity Zones varied with 
respect to factors that may indicate need—such as income level, poverty rates, and 
the prevalence of vacant or abandoned properties.98 Analyses of designated tracts 
have shown that, for the most part, governors selected tracts with lower income, 
higher poverty rates, and higher unemployment than those that were not selected.99 
However, multiple news reports have described Opportunity Zones in 
gentrifying neighborhoods that were already on an upward trajectory.100 Critics fear 
that these designations will attract investment away from the areas that need it 
most101 or even fuel the gentrification process.102 Among the most commonly 
proposed reforms is to add safeguards to the Opportunity Zones law akin to those 
included in the NMTC.103 These include regulatory oversight by the CDFI Fund, a 
competitive application process, and a certification requirement for  
Opportunity Funds.104 
 
94. Opportunity Zones Resources, CMTY. DEV. FIN. INSTS. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/
Pages/Opportunity-Zones.aspx [http://web.archive.org/web/20210123202534/https://www. 
cdfifund.gov/Pages/Opportunity-Zones.aspx ] ( last visited Jan. 23, 2021). 
95. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a) (“In the case of gain from the sale to, or exchange with, an unrelated 
person of any property held by the taxpayer, at the election of the taxpayer gross income for the taxable 
year shall not include so much of such gain as does not exceed the aggregate amount invested by the 
taxpayer in a qualified opportunity fund during the 180-day period beginning on the date of such sale 
or exchange . . . .”). 
96. Sciarretti et al., supra note 80. 
97. Melissa Doell & Sunrita Sen, Opinion, Are Opportunity Zones Really Creating Opportunities?, 
IND. LAW. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/49870-doell-sen-are-
opportunity-zones-really-creating-opportunities [https://perma.cc/9CFA-8U6Z]. 
98. Layser, supra note 18, at 56. 
99. Eldar & Garber, supra note 5, at 2. 
100. Borland, supra note 6. 
101. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
102. Melody Carter, Federal Opportunity Zones: The Newest Gentrification Tool? (May 2019) 
(Master’s thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology), https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/1853/61326/carter_melody_-_op_final.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/ 
F2PS-TMB7] ( last visited Oct. 5, 2021). 
103. See, e.g., Joseph Bateman, How Do Opportunity Zones Differ from Existing Federal Tax 
Incentives for Community Development?, SUMMIT LLC (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.summitllc.us/blog/
how-do-opportunity-zones-differ-from-existing-federal-tax-incentives-for-community-development 
[https://perma.cc/U97Y-AYE9]; Layser, supra note 18. 
104. Bateman, supra note 103; Layser, supra note 18. 
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The next Part provides new, empirical evidence that such reforms may be 
insufficient to prevent Opportunity Funds from investing in gentrifying 
neighborhoods. Specifically, a spatial analysis of NMTC projects shows that NMTC 
investment has disproportionately flowed to places with strong indicia of 
gentrification, even with statutory safeguards. These findings, which cast serious 
doubt on the effectiveness of place-based tax incentives, have important 
implications for policymakers considering whether to use tax incentives to aid in 
the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.105 
II. A SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT PROJECTS 
Despite the long history of place-based tax incentives, limited research has 
analyzed where investments are made within tax-favored zones.106 If gentrifying 
census tracts attract a disproportionate share of tax subsidies, this would raise 
significant questions about the efficiency, equity, and administration of place-based 
tax incentives. It would also provide strong evidence that the designation of 
gentrifying census tracts as Opportunity Zones may be cause for concern. 
Data about the locations of Opportunity Zones investment is not yet available, 
and a lack of robust reporting requirements may prevent researchers from accessing 
such information for the foreseeable future.107 For this reason, this study focuses 
instead on the NMTC. Insights about the NMTC program are relevant for at least 
three reasons. First, they are relevant to evaluate the ongoing federal NMTC 
program and many state-level NMTC incentives modeled after the federal law.108 
To the extent that inefficiencies and inequities exist at the federal level, those 
problems may additionally impact many state policies, thereby necessitating both 
federal and state reforms. 
 
105. Michael J. Novogradac, Community Development Tax Incentives Poised to Help Spur 
COVID-19 Recovery, 11 NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, May 2020, https://www.novoco.com/
periodicals/articles/community-development-tax-incentives-poised-help-spur-covid-19-recovery 
[https://perma.cc/T2TA-9YXY]. 
106. But see Henderson, supra note 12. 
107. Early versions of the Opportunity Zones legislation that were introduced by Sen. Scott 
and Sen. Booker had included provisions for annual data collection, but those provisions were removed 
from the final version of the law. Lydia O’Neal, Senators to Introduce Opportunity Zone Data Mandates 
Bill (2), BLOOMBERG TAX (Apr. 12, 2019, 10:12 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-
report/senators-file-bill-to-reinstate-opportunity-zone-data-mandates [https://perma.cc/ZH6C-
S8VT]; Bob Ibanez, Impact Reporting Is Key Ingredient to Ensuring Successful Implementation of 
Opportunity Zone Incentive, NOVOGRADAC (Oct. 10, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/
notes-from-novogradac/impact-reporting-key-ingredient-ensuring-successful-implementation-opportunity 
-zone-incentive  [https://perma.cc/QWR9-D56Y]. Some commentators predict that a new reporting 
and public disclosure framework will be introduced and enacted under the Biden Administration. See 
Rachel Reilly, EIG OZ Webinar Series | Election Analysis: What Lies Ahead for Opportunity Zones, 
ECONOMIC INNOVATION GRP. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://eig.org/news/eig-oz-webinar-series-
election-analysis-what-lies-ahead-for-opportunity-zones  [https://perma.cc/9QRS-82Z5]. 
108. State NMTC Programs, supra note 29. 
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Second, NMTC siting patterns can help predict investment patterns under the 
Opportunity Zones program.109 The NMTC incentive is structurally analogous to 
the Opportunity Zones incentive, making it a good candidate for generating 
generalizable findings.110 However, as discussed in Part III below, the Opportunity 
Zones law also contains multiple features that one would expect to increase the 
likelihood of subsidies flowing to gentrifying neighborhoods, as compared to the 
NMTC. For this reason, even slight evidence that NMTC investment flows to 
gentrifying census tracts would make it highly probable that Opportunity Funds will 
invest in gentrifying tracts. 
Third, studying the NMTC can help evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards 
that are built into that program. Critics often point to a lack of safeguards in the 
Opportunity Zones law as a reason to expect poor outcomes, and some have 
suggested that the law be reformed to include guardrails akin to those included in 
the NMTC.111 However, if NMTC investment has flowed to gentrifying areas, that 
would provide evidence that the safeguards built into the NMTC are insufficient to 
prevent this problem. For that reason, Opportunity Zones proposals that rely on 
NMTC as a model are likely to fail in this context. 
A. Empirical Strategy 
Accordingly, this study asks whether NMTC subsidies flow disproportionately 
to census tracts that may be experiencing gentrification. I employ two forms of 
spatial statistics to analyze location patterns of NMTC allocations in twenty cities 
to explore whether NMTC investment has been directed to areas that may be 
experiencing gentrification. For reasons explained below, both steps of the analysis 
 
109. See Lester et. al., supra note 13 (using an analysis of the NMTC to help predict Opportunity 
Zones outcomes). 
110. Place-based tax incentives can be designed as direct or indirect tax incentives. Where direct 
tax incentives provide tax benefits directly to entities that invest in low-income communities by 
operating businesses in the area or otherwise engaging with the low-income community, indirect tax 
incentives provide tax benefits to third party investors who help finance such businesses. Layser, supra 
note 16, at 417–18. Both the NMTC and Opportunity Zones incentives provide capital subsidies to 
third-party investors who choose to invest in entities that extend capital to businesses in tax-favored 
zones. Under both the NMTC and Opportunity Zones laws, the value of the tax subsidy is shared 
between third-party investors (who claim the tax preference on their tax returns and therefore receive 
a tax reduction) and downstream entities that receive subsidized financing (and can therefore access 
financing that may otherwise be unavailable, or can secure such financing more cheaply). 
111. See, e.g., Anthony Veerkamp, Opportunity Zones Come into Focus, NAT’L  
TR. CMTY. INV. CORP., https://ntcic.com/news-blog/opportunity-zones-come-into-focus/ 
[https://perma.cc/L9YQ-WDFZ] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021) (advocating for reforms to promote 
“twinning” Opportunity Zones with NMTCs in order to “create guardrails by proxy”); The Promise of 
Opportunity Zones: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm. Cong. of the United States, 115th Cong. 
(2018) (statement of Maurice A. Jones, President & CEO, Local Initiatives Support Corporation), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg30384/html/CHRG-115shrg30384.htm 
[https://perma.cc/AS6U-VUGF] (advocating for more active administration of the Opportunity 
Zones incentive “in a manner similar to the process for allocating the new markets tax credit”). 
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consider how NMTC allocation patterns relate to two variables known to correlate 
to gentrification: vacancy rates and rent increases. 
First, I use a descriptive quadrat density analysis to describe the point density 
of NMTC allocations within each city.112 This geographic research method was 
chosen because it produces descriptions of NMTC project data that take into 
account the different sizes of census tracts. As a result, the quadrat analysis reveals 
whether allocations cluster in areas that may be gentrifying. As described in Part 
II.C, the results of the quadrat analysis show that the density of NMTC projects is 
consistently highest in census tracts that exhibit signs of gentrification. 
Second, I fit a negative binomial regression model to the data to describe the 
strength of the relationship between NMTC allocation locations and variables 
associated with gentrification.113 This form of regression model is commonly used 
to analyze count data, such as the number of projects per census tract. Here, the 
model is used to determine whether vacancy rates or rent increases are predictive of 
the spatial patterns observed through the quadrat density analysis, after controlling 
for other variables that may affect the outcome (e.g., race, income, and changes in 
racial or income attributes). As described in Part II.D, the results show that, in many 
cities, vacancy rates or rent change are the largest statistically significant predictor 
of NMTC allocations. 
Taken together, the quadrat density analysis and the negative binomial 
regression analysis will answer the question of whether NMTC investment has 
flowed to places that exhibit signs of gentrification. Significantly, the purpose of 
this analysis is not to test whether tax incentives cause gentrification. Instead, the 
purpose is to describe the spatial patterns of NMTC investment to help evaluate 
whether the incentive has produced efficient and equitable outcomes. In addition, 
the results of this study can help predict how investors will respond to other place-
based tax incentives, including Opportunity Zones. 
1. High Vacancy Rates as an Indicator of Gentrification 
The vacancy rate variable was selected as a key indicator of gentrification 
rooted in both theoretical and empirical literatures. Though the presence of vacant 
properties may seem counterintuitive to the concept of gentrification,114 such 
conditions are consistent with one of the most established supply-side theories 
about the gentrification process. Supply-side theories posit that “an oversupply of 
 
112. Y. Yuan, Y. Qiang, K. Bin Asad & T.E. Chow, Point Pattern Analysis, in GEOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY BODY OF KNOWLEDGE (1st Quarter 2020 ed., John  
P. Wilson ed., 2020), https://gistbok.ucgis.org/bok-topics/point-pattern-analysis [https://perma.cc/ 
9Y7Z-R74G] (describing quadrat analysis methodology). 
113. Jerald F. Lawless, Negative Binomial and Mixed Poisson Regression, 15 CANADIAN  
J. STAT. 209 (1987) (describing negative binomial regression models). 
114. Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections, Causes, and 
Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195, 195 (1985) 
(“Abandonment results from demand declining to zero, gentrification from high and  
increasing demand.”). 
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undervalued urban housing drives investors to redevelop in the hope of tapping 
into a latent demand.”115 These theories can be traced to Neil Smith’s rent gap 
theory, which predicted “that gentrification is most likely to happen in areas where 
there is a wide gap between the potential value of a parcel of land and the current 
actual prices.”116 
Specifically, Smith argued that capital investment will flow to places where the 
rate of return is highest.117 Property is abandoned in some places as capital is 
deployed in other, more profitable, locations.118 As structures are abandoned and 
left to decay, the market value of property may drop below its potential use value, 
creating what Smith calls the “rent gap.”119 When the rent gap is wide enough, 
developers can purchase property cheaply, incur rehabilitation costs, and then resell 
the property at a profitable rate of return that is satisfactory to the developer.120 
Although rent gaps can be found in many neighborhoods that have 
experienced decline, Smith argued that reinvestment in any given place rarely occurs 
without some form of collective social action.121 Accordingly, “builders, developers, 
landlords, mortgage lenders, government agencies, real estate agents, and tenants” 
all play important roles in initiating processes of revitalization and gentrification.122 
In the context of urban redevelopment initiatives, neighborhoods with significant 
rent gaps may gentrify due to the collective action of the state, which bears some of 
the risk of investment by providing subsidies, and private developers. Though 
Smith’s rent gap theory has been the subject of decades of debate, it remains a 
“dominant explanation of the creation of gentrifiable property, which is generally 
viewed as an important facet of gentrification.”123 
Given the rent gap theory, “[i]t makes sense that gentrification might relate to 
abandonment because a certain level of abandonment may be necessary for the first 
wave of gentrification to occur.”124 Two recent studies have found that high 
vacancy rates are positively correlated with gentrification.125 Geography professor 
Victoria Morckel found that, in statistical models, as gentrification increases, 
abandonment also increases.126 Morkel notes: 
Although counterintuitive, perhaps the gentrification factor indicates that 
neighborhoods with a high value on the gentrification factor are 
 
115. Adam Eckerd, Cleaning Up Without Clearing Out? A Spatial Assessment of Environmental 
Gentrification, 47 URB. AFFS. REV. 31, 35 (2011). 
116. Id. 
117. Smith, supra note 42, at 546. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 545.  
120. Smith, supra note 117, at 545. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 540. 
123. Daniel J. Hammel, Gentrification and Land Rent: A Historical View of the Rent Gap in 
Minneapolis, 20 URB. GEOGRAPHY 116, 119 (1999). 
124. Morckel, supra note 21, at 488. 
125. Lee & Newman, supra note 31; Morckel, supra note 21. 
126. Morckel, supra note 21, at 489. 
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neighborhoods in transition—that is, neighborhoods with abandonment 
that are also experiencing redevelopment and socioeconomic change. If so, 
the gentrification factor might predict abandonment by default because 
abandonment may covary in the early stages of gentrification as previously 
stated. Another potential explanation is that in some neighborhoods 
experiencing gentrification, low-income residents move out more quickly 
than high income residents move in, leaving vacant units.127 
Urban planning professors Ryun Jung Lee and Galen Newman asked whether 
clustered vacant properties were associated with the neighborhood gentrification 
process and if certain types of vacant properties were more likely to serve as catalysts 
for gentrification.128 They found that “clustered residential and commercial 
vacancies . . . are positively associated with neighborhood gentrification.”129 Based 
on the theoretical and empirical evidence that high vacancy rates are associated with 
gentrification, this study uses vacancy rate as an indicator of possible gentrification. 
2. Increasing Rent as an Indicator of Gentrification 
The rent increase variable was also selected as a key indicator of gentrification 
rooted in theoretical and empirical literatures. Where the vacancy rate variable is 
grounded in supply-side theories focused on preconditions for the gentrification 
process, rent inflation is associated with demand-side theories and the later stages 
of gentrification. One articulation of demand-side theories for gentrification posits 
that “changing culture and increased costs of commuting have encouraged people 
who desire certain amenities and housing close to the urban core to drive prices up 
in previously lower class communities.”130 
In other words, as demand for living in a neighborhood increases, so does the 
price to live there—including rental rates. For this reason, some gentrification 
studies have used rent inflation as a standalone proxy for gentrification.131 
Professors Lance Freeman and Frank Braconi use increase in market rate rents as 
an independent indicator of possible gentrification, noting that “it is the notion that 
gentrification leads to increased demand in a neighborhood, and consequently to 
rising rents, that is thought to spur displacement.”132 Hammel and Wyley have 
developed a model for identifying gentrified areas with census data.133 Though their 
model contained nine independent variables, they note that income, occupation, 
 
127. Id. 
128. Lee & Newman, supra note 31. 
129. Id. at 9. 
130. Eckerd, supra note 115, at 35. 
131. Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement: New York City in the 
1990s, 70 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 39 (2004). 
132. Id. at 45. 
133. See generally Hammel & Wyly, supra note 32. 
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and rent contributed most to the model.134 Rent change, viewed independently, was 
a significant variable for accurately predicting gentrification.135 
Rent increases have also been observed in case studies of gentrifying 
neighborhoods.136 To the extent there is debate over the role of rent change in 
gentrification, it relates to the degree of displacement it causes. For example, one 
study found that “although rental inflation is related to displacement in gentrifying 
neighborhoods, the magnitude of the relationship is rather modest.”137 Another 
gentrification study found little, if any, mobility out of gentrifying 
neighborhoods.138 However, others have noted that the apparent stability in 
gentrifying neighborhoods may reflect heightened efforts by residents to remain in 
their improving neighborhoods, “even if it means paying more rent or doubling 
up.”139 Since “higher rent burdens are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term,” 
it is possible that displacement may occur at later stages of gentrification.140 For 
these reasons, this study uses rent increase as an indicator of possible gentrification. 
B. Data 
1. NMTC Project Data 
Two sources of NMTC project data are examined in this study. The regression 
analysis is performed using government data available from the Community 
Development Financial Institution (CDFI) Fund’s 2019 public data release.141 The 
dataset contains the census tract locations of 5,799 NMTC allocations made from 
2003 to 2017.142 This comprehensive dataset provides a complete account of where 
NMTC investments have flowed during the program’s history. 
However, the dataset available from the CDFI Fund does not include project 
addresses and is therefore unsuitable for the quadrat analysis performed here. For 
this reason, the quadrat analysis is performed using a separate dataset of NMTC 
project addresses published online by the accounting firm Novogradac LLP (the 
“Novagradac dataset”).143 The dataset contains 5,497 entries that describe projects 




136. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 32. 
137. Freeman, supra note 30, at 482. 
138. Id. 
139. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 37. 
140. Id. 
141. This data is available for download at https://www.cdfifund.gov/sites/cdfi/files/2021-
05/FY2019_Data_Documentation_Instruction.zip [https://perma.cc/4YNF-8T3P]. Note that the 
file also contains data about four projects with allocation origination years prior to 2003. 
142. Id. 
143. QLICIs by State, NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/new-
markets-tax-credits/application-allocation/qlicis-state [https://perma.cc/BX8G-8TS2] ( last visited 
Oct. 6, 2021). 
144. See id. (data on file with author). 
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converted to latitude and longitude coordinates, and duplicate points were 
removed.145 This yielded 2,978 unique, geocoded projects suitable for  
spatial analysis.146 
The study sample includes all cities that had at least thirty projects in the 
Novogradac dataset. This threshold was intended to ensure sufficient sample size. 
The following twenty cities met this cutoff: Milwaukee, New Orleans, Chicago, 
Portland, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Jackson, St. Louis, Phoenix, Baltimore, New 
York, Cincinnati, Denver, Boston, Columbus, Louisville, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, and Seattle. These urban study areas are drawn from Northeast, South, 
Midwest, and West regions of the United States, providing opportunities for 
regional comparisons. 
2. Census Tract Data 
For each study city, 2010 census tract boundaries were obtained from the 
census TIGER/Line shapefiles database.147 Census tract attributes were obtained 
via an API pull from the relevant five-year (2006–2010 or 2013–2017) American 
Community Survey (ACS) datasets.148 This data includes vacancy rates (2010),149 
median gross rent (2010 and 2017),150 median gross income (2010 and 2017),151 
 
145. The R code used to perform this step is located at https://uofi.box.com/s/
kh7zalt1n1bnp7j7j1lo5g1s39fykgmu [https://perma.cc/67HF-RKRH]. 
146. A csv file containing the unique project data is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/
3006ilx5taki2ru1edxy0ptoj46078d7 [https://perma.cc/SJ5P-YMF5]. 
147. The R code used to perform this step is located at https://uofi.box.com/s/
fnjhee3zwsklyc6z8lubua3z2mrbfk9b [https://perma.cc/XHE3-8W79]. 
148. The R code used to perform this step is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/
dya64az31w01dypxf5r5bmj2btoj8w12 [https://perma.cc/G2TW-Z2GW]. 
149. The 2010 vacancy rate variable is listed as acs5/profile variable number DP04_0003P. See 
Census Data API: Variables in /data/2010/acs/acs5/profile/variables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:/
/api.census.gov/data/2010/acs/acs5/profile/variables.html [https://perma.cc/5GPW-GKL7] (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Data Profile Variables (2010) ]. 
150. The 2010 median gross rent variable is listed as acs5/profile variable number 
B25064_001E. See Census Data API: Variables in data/2010/acs/acs5/variables, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://api.census.gov/data/2010/acs/acs5/variables.html [https://perma.cc/97NY-
8ZLG] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021). The 2017 median gross rent variable is listed as acs5/profile variable 
number B25031_001E. See Census Data API: Variables in data/2017/acs/acs5/variables, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://api.census.gov/data/2017/acs/acs5/variables.html [https://perma.cc/K4RL-
YV34] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021). 
151. Both the 2010 and 2017 median gross income variables are listed as acs5/profile variable 
number DP03_0086 (median family income). See Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149; Census 
Data API: Variables in /data/2017/acs/acs5/profile/variables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
api.census.gov/data/2017/acs/acs5/profile/variables.html [https://perma.cc/9NKY-CYWY] ( last 
visited Jan. 1, 2021 ) [hereinafter Data Profile Variables (2017) ]. Both the 2010 and 2017 median gross 
income variables are listed as acs5/profile variable number DP03_0086 (median family income). See 
Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149; Data Profile Variables (2017), supra. 
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percent Black population (2010),152 percent white population (2010 and 2017),153 
and total households (2010).154 
The eligibility status of census tracts for NMTC allocations was determined 
using PolicyMap’s dataset of “New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) eligibility status, 
for CY 2017 using 2006–2010 eligibility data.”155 After joining the data to the census 
tract shapefiles, I extracted the subset of tracts that were eligible for NMTC 
allocations.156 Limiting the sample in this way helps avoid excess zeros caused by 
zero counts in ineligible census tracts.157 
C. Quadrat Density Analysis 
1. Methods 
A quadrat density analysis was used to describe the spatial patterns of NMTC 
project locations in each city in order to determine whether investment appears to 
cluster in areas that exhibit signs of gentrification. To perform a quadrat density 
analysis, each study area is “divided into smaller sub-regions (i.e., quadrats), and 
then the point density is computed for each sub-region.”158 For each quadrat, the 
point density is computed by dividing the number of points in the quadrat by the 
quadrat’s area.159 In this analysis, two quadrat analyses were performed for each 
study city, with quadrats defined with reference to census tract attributes.160 In the 
 
152. The 2010 percent black population variable is listed as acs5/profile variable number 
DP05_0033P. See Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149. 
153. Both the 2010 and 2017 percent white population variables are listed as acs5/profile 
variable number DP05_0032P. See Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149; Data Profile Variables 
(2017), supra note 151. 
154. The 2010 total households variable is listed as acs5/profile variable number DP02_0001E. 
See Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149. 
155. POLICY MAP, https://illinois.policymap.com/maps?i=9894665&btd=6&period=2006-
2010&lind=111&cx=-96.68649857479217&cy=35.65445151828503&cz=2 [https://perma.cc/XN3A 
-DNU2] (New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) eligibility status, for CY 2017 using 2006–2010  
eligibility data). 
156. The R code for this step is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/
vohi3exf3tbcxgrhimylv2hmbnwxcod6 [https://perma.cc/C4XV-D8FQ]. 
157. An analysis of all census tracts would produce two types of zero counts. The first would 
be counts of zero projects in tracts that were not eligible for NMTC allocations. The second would be 
counts of zero projects in tracts that were eligible, but were not chosen by investors. Only the latter 
category is of interest in this study, which is focused on understanding which eligible census tracts are 
most likely to be selected for tax-subsidized investment. The former category is referred to as “excess 
zeros,” which can skew regression results. See Peter A. Lachenbruch, Analysis of Data with Excess Zeros, 
11 STAT. METHODS MED. RSCH. 297 (2002). 
158. Yuan et al., supra note 112. 
159. MANUEL GIMOND, INTRO TO GIS AND SPATIAL ANALYSIS ch. 11 (2021) (ebook), https:/
/mgimond.github.io/Spatial/index.html [https://perma.cc/7R9Z-7WB9]. 
160. Traditionally, quadrats are defined by regions with equal area. J. López De La Cruz  
& M.A. Gutiérrez, Spatial Statistics of Pitting Corrosion Patterning: Quadrat Counts and the  
Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process, 50 CORROSION SCI. 1441 (2008). However, quadrats can also be 
defined with reference to an underlying covariate, such as ranges of elevation, population size, or 
income level. GIMOND, supra note 159. In such cases, the quadrats may have non-uniform shape and 
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first, quadrats were defined with reference to 2010 vacancy rates. In the second, 
quadrats were defined with reference to the change in median rents during the 
period between the 2010 five-year ACS survey and the 2017 five-year  
ACS survey.161 
Each city was divided into six subregions—or quadrats—to be analyzed. 
Dividing the cities into six subregions allows for a more detailed analysis of the 
spatial patterns than the more traditional four-region division. The six quadrats were 
defined with reference to standard deviations (denoted by the symbol σ) from the 
mean value of the underlying variable. For example, Quadrats 1, 2, and 3 include 
census tracts that experienced lower than average rent increases (or vacancy rates) 
during the study period, while Quadrats 4, 5, and 6 include census tracts that 
experienced higher than average rent increases (or vacancy rates). Table 1 
summarizes the ranges included in each quadrat. 
 
Quadrat Range 
1 -inf: -2σ from mean 
2 -2σ from mean: -1σ from mean 
3 -1σ from mean: mean 
4 mean: +1σ from mean 
5 +1σ from mean: +2σ from mean 
6 +2σ from mean: inf 
Table 1: Quadrat Ranges with Reference to Census Tract Percent Rent 
Increase (2010–2017) or Vacancy Rate (2010) 
 
For each city, a map of the quadrats was projected using the 
NAD_1983_StatePlane coordinate system appropriate for its location.162 I then 
overlayed the point locations of all NMTC projects for which addresses are 
available, as described in Part II.B above. For example, figure 1 visualizes the New 
York City quadrats with NMTC projects overlayed on the map. 
 
area. Id. The R code for the quadrat analyses performed in this study are available at https://
uofi.box.com/s/z2g7nkewfodzhc9qgnyp bzl7wd4jf3un [https://perma.cc/34N6-EZVX]. 
161. Because the purpose of the quadrat analyses is to describe the locations of NMTC projects 
within the fiscal geographies eligible for NMTC allocations—not within the cities as a whole—I began 
by using R code to extract subsets of NMTC-eligible census tracts within city boundaries. The R code 
used for this step is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/y35ejfq64dg8w4hvje0odtz3kon1nd0d 
[https://perma.cc/NTK4-GBK8]. This step produced twenty unique shapefiles containing the 
NMTC fiscal geographies of each study city. Each file was rendered as a raster layer to ensure 
compatibility with the quadratcount() function from the SPATSTAT package. Himanshu Mathur  
& Stefania Bertazzon, Rasterizing Census Geography: Definition and Optimization of a Regular Grid, in 
ADVANCES IN GISCIENCE 251–69 (Monica Sester, Lars Bernard & Volker Paelke eds., 2009) http://
link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-00318-9_13 [https://perma.cc/3SSJ-Q36D]. 
162. ArcGIS 10.1 Projected Coordinate System Tables, ESRI, https://desktop.arcgis.com/en/
arcmap/10.3/guide-books/map-projections/pdf/projected_coordinate_systems.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YR9C-TB2E] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021). 
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Figure 1: Chicago NMTC Projects (2001–2009) Plotted on Rent Change 
Quadrat Map* (Percent Change from 2010–2017†) 
* Quadrats 1–6 reflect subregions of NMTC-eligible census tracts defined with 
reference to census tract change in median gross rent. Areas in Quadrat 1 experienced 
the lowest increase (or a decrease) in median gross rent during the study period. Areas 
in Quadrat 6 experienced the highest increase in median gross rent during the study 
period. 
†Median Gross Rent values for 2010 and 2017 obtained from the 5-year American 
Community Survey for years 2006-2010 and 2013-2017. 
 
Finally, the quadratcount() function from the spatstat package in R was used 
to generate point counts within each quadrat and compute the point density within 
each quadrat. The point density counts are expressed as the number of projects per 
square mile. 
2. Results 
The quadrat analyses describe the point density of NMTC projects, where the 
results for each quadrat are expressed in terms of the number of projects per square 
mile. As this subsection will explain, the results of the quadrat analysis demonstrate 
that the point density of NMTC projects is often highest in eligible census tracts 
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that either (a) have higher than average vacancy rates or (b) have higher than average 
rent increases. Because both high vacancy rates and rent increases are known to 
correlate with gentrification, these results suggest that NMTC investment has 
clustered in areas that may be experiencing gentrification. 
It is important to note that higher point density in a quadrat does not 
necessarily correspond to higher raw numbers of projects in that quadrat. Since 
point density is calculated with reference to area—and the sizes of census tracts 
differ—point density is affected by the size of the quadrat subregions. In many 
cases, Quadrats 1, 2, 5 and 6 had smaller areas than Quadrats 3 and 4. By way of 
illustration, figure 2 and figure 3 provide a side-by-side comparison of the 
Philadelphia rent change quadrat map and the project density in the same quadrats. 
 
Figure 2: Philadelphia NMTC Projects (2001–2009) Plotted on Rent Change 
Quadrat Map (Percent Change from 2010–2017†) (Q1 = Lowest; Q6 = Highest) 
†Median Gross Rent values for 2010 and 2017 obtained from the 5-year American 
Community Survey for years 2006-2010 and 2013-2017. 
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Figure 3: Density of Philadelphia NMTC Projects (2001–2009) (in 
projects per square mile) by Rent Change Quadrat (Percent Change from 
2010–2017†) 
†Median Gross Rent values for 2010 and 2017 obtained from the 5-year American 
Community Survey for years 2006-2010 and 2013-2017. 
 
Moreover, cross-city comparisons of raw point-density values may not be 
meaningful due to variations in cities’ sizes and numbers of projects. However, a 
comparison of trends across the sample is meaningful. As this Section will explain, 
the results were highly consistent across the twenty cities in the study sample, 
showing that in nearly every city, NMTC projects were disproportionately located 
in (a) areas with a higher share of vacant properties relative to other eligible tracts 
and (b) areas that are experiencing a higher increase in median gross rent relative to 
other eligible tracts. Both of these trends provide evidence that, in many cities, 
NMTC allocations have flowed to areas that exhibit at least one of two variables 
predictive of gentrification: high vacancy rates and rent increases. 
As Part III will explain, these results suggest that the NMTC may be an 
inefficient subsidy in most cities, and it raises important questions about whether 
its outcomes are equitable. However, some variations across the sample are also 
notable. As this Section will explain, the quadrat analyses did yield a handful of 
outliers. For example, in both Milwaukee and New York City, project density was 
highest in rent change Quadrat 1, where rent increases were smallest (or, in some 
cases, rental rates were declining) during the period. Possible reasons for this 
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heterogeneity, and its implications for tax incentive administration, will also be 
discussed in Part III. The remainder of this Subsection II.C.2 will describe the 
results of the quadrat density analyses in each region. 
a. Point Density and Vacancy Rates 
The vacancy rate quadrat analysis showed that project density is consistently 
highest in quadrats with the highest vacancy rates, suggesting that NMTC projects 
are most likely to be located in areas that may be experiencing gentrification. In all 
but two cities (Cleveland and Minneapolis), the density of NMTC projects was 
highest in Quadrat 5 or Quadrat 6, where vacancy rates were highest. Table 2 shows 
the density of NMTC projects per quadrat for each city studied. Figures 4–7 display 
the results in each region using bar charts. 
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Northeast Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Boston 1.499 0.668 1.018 0.094 1.500 0.916 
New York 0.000 0.365 0.549 0.690 0.683 0.865 
Philadelphia 0.000 0.098 0.049 0.592 0.280 1.354 
Pittsburgh 0.000 0.417 0.486 0.398 2.854 0.000 
  
Midwest Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Chicago 0.000 0.042 0.274 0.319 0.398 0.325 
Cincinnati 0.000 0.000 0.140 0.291 0.612 9.195 
Cleveland 0.000 0.163 1.157 0.491 0.154 0.446 
Columbus 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.248 0.363 0.456 
Milwaukee 0.000 0.000 0.977 1.039 2.832 2.000 
Minneapolis 0.000 0.613 0.405 1.266 0.355 1.077 
St. Louis 0.000 0.000 0.346 1.121 0.529 4.719 
  
South Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Baltimore 0.000 0.062 0.095 0.753 1.066 2.272 
Jackson 0.000 0.000 0.456 0.134 0.109 0.753 
Louisville 0.000 0.145 0.151 0.244 2.487 1.059 
New Orleans 0.366 0.297 0.013 0.009 3.529 0.112 
  
West Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Denver 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.337 0.337 1.769 
Los Angeles 0.000 0.029 0.286 0.105 0.422 0.504 
Phoenix 0.000 0.144 0.148 0.077 0.582 0.757 
Portland 0.000 0.042 0.650 0.756 0.047 4.002 
Seattle 1.890 0.000 0.449 0.540 1.098 7.204 
Table 2: NMTC Project Density (in Number of Projects Per Square Mile) 
by Vacancy Rate Quadrat (percent vacancies, 2010)* 
*Quadrats 1–6 reflect subregions of NMTC-eligible census tracts defined with 
reference to census tract change vacancy rate (2010). Areas in Quadrat 1 had the lowest 
vacancy rates as of the 2010 five-year American Community Survey, and areas in 
Quadrat 6 experienced the highest vacancy rate during the same period. 
 
Figure 4 shows that in the Northeast cities studied, the point density of NMTC 
projects was highest in vacancy rate Quadrat 6 in New York, Philadelphia, and 
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Pittsburgh. In other words, in these cities, the density of NMTC projects was 
highest in the parts of the cities where vacancy rates were also highest. This pattern 
was especially notable in the two Pennsylvania cities, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, 
suggesting that in those cities, projects tended to cluster in areas with high vacancy 
rates. In contrast, in Boston, the density of NMTC projects was roughly the same 
in Quadrat 1 as in Quadrat 5, and the overall point density was skewed toward areas 
with lower vacancy rates. 
Figure 5 shows that in the Midwest cities studied, the point density of NMTC 
projects was highest in vacancy rate Quadrat 6 in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, 
and St. Louis. The point density of NMTC was highest in Quadrat 5 in Chicago and 
Milwaukee. These results describe spatial patterns in which NMTC projects appear 
to cluster in the two subregions with the highest vacancy rates. This pattern is 
especially notable in Cincinnati and St. Louis. Of the seven Midwest cities studied, 
the only city that did not follow this pattern was Minneapolis, which had a more 
even distribution of projects across quadrats. 
Figure 6 shows that in the Western cities studied, the point density of NMTC 
projects was highest in vacancy rate Quadrat 6 in all five cities: Denver, Los Angeles, 
Phoenix, Portland, and Seattle. These results describe spatial patterns in which 
NMTC projects appear to cluster in the subregion with the highest vacancy rate. 
This pattern is especially notable in Portland and Seattle, where point density was 
significantly higher in Quadrat 6 than in any other quadrat. 
Figure 7 shows that in the Southern cities studied, the point density of NMTC 
projects was highest in vacancy rate Quadrat 6 in two cities (Baltimore and Jackson) 
and in Quadrat 5 in two cities (Louisville and New Orleans). These results describe 
spatial patterns in which NMTC projects appear to cluster in the two subregions 
with the highest vacancy rate. This pattern is especially visible in Baltimore, 
Louisville, and New Orleans. In Jackson, the quadrat with the second-highest point 
density was Quadrat 3, where census tract vacancy rates were within one standard 
deviation below the mean. 
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Figures 4-7: Density of NMTC projects (in number of projects per mile) 
by vacancy rate quadrat (2010) (Q1 = Lowest; Q6 = Highest) 
 
Figure 4: Northeast 
 
Figure 5: Midwest 
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Figure 6: West 
 
Figure 7: South 
b. Point Density and Rent Increase 
In most cities, project density is also highest in quadrats with the highest 
increase in gross median rent, providing further evidence that NMTC projects are 
most likely to be located in areas that may be experiencing gentrification. In all but 
six cities (Boston, Chicago, Louisville, Milwaukee, Phoenix and New York), the 
density of NMTC projects was highest in Quadrat 5 or Quadrat 6, where rent 
increases were highest. Table 3 shows the density of NMTC projects per quadrat 
for each city studied. Figures 8 and 9 visualize the results for each region using bar 
charts. 
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Northeast Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Boston 0.000 1.246 0.977 1.242 1.103 0.000 
New York 2.550 0.080 0.465 0.736 1.944 1.346 
Philadelphia 0.000 0.129 0.097 0.409 0.445 1.839 
Pittsburgh 0.000 0.000 0.242 1.364 1.251 1.728 
       
Midwest Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Chicago 0.000 0.127 0.367 0.257 0.000 0.000 
Cincinnati 1.019 0.199 0.076 0.341 0.518 9.865 
Cleveland 0.000 0.607 0.449 0.557 0.952 2.744 
Columbus 0.000 0.050 0.112 0.128 0.348 1.517 
Milwaukee 3.355 1.659 1.139 0.630 1.697 2.011 
Minneapolis 0.000 0.000 0.573 0.536 2.281 0.000 
St. Louis 0.000 0.111 0.249 0.724 1.145 5.285 
       
South Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Baltimore 0.000 0.000 0.347 0.838 2.031 0.000 
Jackson 0.000 0.067 0.219 0.057 0.000 2.660 
Louisville 0.000 0.000 0.861 0.048 0.000 0.000 
New Orleans 0.176 0.206 0.006 0.177 0.660 1.911 
       
West Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Denver 0.264 0.092 0.191 0.155 0.575 0.645 
Los Angeles 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.240 0.523 0.359 
Phoenix 0.000 0.115 0.220 2.951 0.000 0.000 
Portland 0.000 0.597 0.117 0.266 4.912 7.646 
Seattle 0.000 0.111 0.249 0.724 1.145 5.285 
Table 3: NMTC Project Density (in Number of Projects Per Square Mile) 
by Rent Change Quadrat (percent change, 2010–2017)* 
*Quadrats 1–6 reflect subregions of NMTC-eligible census tracts defined with 
reference to census tract change in gross median income (2010–2017). Areas in 
Quadrat 1 had the lowest increase in gross median rent (or a decrease in gross median 
rent) during the period between the 2010 five-year American Community Survey 
(2006–2010 average values) and the 2017 five-year American Community Survey 
(2013–2017 average values), and areas in Quadrat 6 experienced the highest increases 
in gross median rent during the same period. 
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Figure 8 shows that in the Northeast cities studied, the point density of NMTC 
projects was highest in rent change rate Quadrat 6 in both Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh. In these cities, the point density was highest where rent increases were 
also highest. In contrast, in Boston and New York, point density was highest in 
Quadrat 2 and Quadrat 1, respectively. In these cities, point density was highest in 
parts of the cities where rents were increasing most slowly (or, in some cases, 
declining). However, it is worth noting that in Boston, the NMTCs were relatively 
evenly distributed across rent change Quadrats 2–5, and in New York, the second 
and third highest point densities were found in Quadrats 5 and 6. These patterns 
suggest that projects are not clustered in the lowest quadrats of either city. 
Figure 9 shows that in the Midwest cities studied, the point density of NMTC 
projects was highest in rent change rate Quadrat 6 in Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Columbus, and St. Louis. Point density was highest in rent change Quadrat 5 in 
Minneapolis. In each of these cities, the spatial patterns suggest that projects cluster 
in areas where rent is increasing. In contrast, in Chicago, no projects were located 
in either of Quadrats 5 or 6, and point density was highest in Quadrat 3. This 
suggests that projects do not cluster in areas where rent is increasing in Chicago. In 
Milwaukee, point density was highest in Quadrat 1, but it was second highest in 
Quadrat 6, and no clear pattern is evident. 
Figure 10 shows that in the Southern cities studied, the point density of 
NMTC projects was highest in rent change rate Quadrat 6 in Jackson and New 
Orleans. Point density was highest in rent change Quadrat 5 in Baltimore. In each 
of these cities, the NMTC investment has clustered in areas where rent is increasing. 
In Louisville, no projects were located in either of Quadrats 5 or 6. In that city, 
point density was highest in Quadrat 3, where the rate of rent increase was within 
one standard deviation below the mean. This suggests that projects do not cluster 
in areas where rent is increasing in Louisville. 
Figure 11 shows that in the Western cities studied, the point density of NMTC 
projects was highest in rent change rate Quadrat 6 in Denver, Portland, and Seattle. 
Point density was highest in rent change Quadrat 5 in Los Angeles. In Phoenix, no 
projects were located in Quadrats 5 or 6. However, the point density in Phoenix 
was significantly higher in Quadrat 4, where rent increases were within one standard 
deviation above the mean, than in any of the lower quadrats. This suggests that 
projects did cluster in parts of the city with higher-than-average rent increases but 
not in areas with the highest rent increases during the period. 
  
Clean Final Edit_Layser_V2.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:16 AM 
198 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:163 
Figures 8-11: Density of NMTC projects (in number of projects per 
mile) by rent change rate quadrat (2010–2017) (Q1 = Lowest; Q6 = Highest) 
 
Figure 8: Northeast 
 
Figure 9: Midwest 
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Figure 10: South 
 
 
Figure 11: West 
D. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis 
1. Model 
The quadrat density analyses above are useful to describe relative point 
distributions across subregions, but they may not provide a reliable indication of 
how they relate to the explanatory variables studied. For example, it can tell us that 
in Philadelphia, NMTC projects appear to be clustered in parts of the city where 
rent is increasing the most. However, it cannot tell us how much the count of NMTC 
projects increases as a function of increasing rent. For this, a negative binomial 
regression analysis was used to model the relationship between project frequency 
and the vacancy rate and rent change variables. This analysis describes the strength 
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of the relationship between project frequency and key indicators of gentrification, 
including vacancy rates and rent increases. Specifically, the results of the analyses 
provide information about how much the observed count of projects has increased 
with each unit change in vacancy rate or rent increase. 
Count data, like the project count data analyzed in this study, is often modeled 
using the Poisson point process model.163 In its most fundamental form, the 
Poisson point process describes a random benchmark against which point patterns, 
such as the count of items within a given area, can be compared.164 Specifically, a 
Poisson distribution assumes that the probability of an observed outcome (e.g., the 
count of NMTC allocations in a census tract) can be expressed as follows: 
 





                             (1) 
 
where “Yi is the random variable representing a count, yi is a particular count value 
(e.g., 3), 𝜆𝜆! is the sole parameter representing the expected value of the count, and 
i = 1, 2, . . . N indexes the N cases.”165 
The Poisson point process has been used to develop various models to define 
point patterns, including a model to describe “changes in point density as a function 
of a covariate.”166 For example, the Poisson process model has been used to model 
the frequency of gun violence relative to segregation and poverty rates.167 Here, a 
version of the Poisson point process model can be used to describe how frequently 
NMTC projects occur in census tracts with attributes associated with gentrification 
(e.g., vacancy rate, rent change). When, as here, the objective is to capture 
“systematic variation in 𝜆𝜆! , the value of 𝜆𝜆! is most commonly placed within a  
loglinear model.”168 The basic model has been expressed as follows169: 
 
ln(𝜆𝜆) = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘'()*                                        (2) 
 
 
163. Andreas Lindén & Samu Mäntyniemi, Using the Negative Binomial Distribution to Model 
Overdispersion in Ecological Count Data, 92 ECOLOGY 1414 (2011). 
164. López De La Cruz & Gutiérrez, supra note 160. 
165. Richard Berk & John M. MacDonald, Overdispersion and Poisson Regression, 24  
J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 269, 277 (2008). 
166. GIMOND, supra note 159. 
167. See David A. Larsen, Sandra Lane, Timothy Jennings-Bey, Arnett Haygood-El, Kim 
Brundage & Robert A. Rubinstein, Spatio-Temporal Patterns of Gun Violence in Syracuse, New York 
2009-2015, PLOS ONE (Mar 20, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0173001 
[https://perma.cc/EZ6H-ZDD5]. 
168. Berk & MacDonald, supra note 165. A traditional linear regression is disfavored for 
modeling counts since count values cannot drop below zero, but linear models often predict  
negative values. 
169. Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public 
Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 708 (2012). 
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where ln(𝜆𝜆) is the natural logarithm of the expected count of NMTC projects in a 
given location. This value, which is sometimes referred to as “point intensity,”170 is 
expressed relative to “a vector of explanatory variables, xk and their associated 
regression coefficients, 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘.”171 The equation describes a point pattern as a loglinear 
function of the underlying covariates, whereby “intensity is exponentially increasing 
or decreasing as a function of the covariate.”172 
However, the NMTC data used for this study does not meet a key assumption 
of the general Poisson point process model, which requires that “the residual 
variance be equal to the fitted values, 𝜆𝜆.”173 A preliminary analysis of the sample 
data showed that, in most cities, the residual variance significantly exceeds the mean. 
This result, which is referred to as “overdispersion,” violates the assumption 
required by the Poisson process model.174 Overdispersion is likely when there are 
potentially important variables that are not captured by the model or when error 
exists in the estimates of variables that are considered.175 In this case, there are 
variables that would be nearly impossible to capture, such as variations in nontax 
legal frameworks or political dynamics that may affect investment decisions. 
For this reason, this analysis employs a common method for addressing 
overdispersion, which is “to specify that the probability of the observed outcome, 
y, follows a negative binomial distribution.”176 The resulting model is a negative 
binomial regression model, which has been shown to fit data better than other 
models when counts are infrequent, as they are in the case of NMTC allocations. 
The resulting model is a negative binomial regression model, which has been shown 
to fit data better than other models when counts are infrequent, as they are in the 
case of NMTC allocations.177 The negative binomial regression is a version of the 
Poisson process model that includes the negative binomial distribution parameter. 
The negative binomial distribution has been expressed as: 
 












                 (3) 
 
where “Γ is the gamma function, 𝜆𝜆 is the mean or expected value of the distribution, 
and 𝛼𝛼 is the overdispersion parameter.”178 
 
170. GIMOND, supra note 159. 
171. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708. 
172. GIMOND, supra note 159. 
173. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708. 
174. Id. 
175. Haibin Liu, Rachel A. Davidson, David V. Rosowsky & Jery R. Stedinger, Negative 
Binomial Regression of Electric Power Outages in Hurricanes, 11 J. INFRASTRUCTURE SYS. 258, 262 (2005). 
176. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708. 
177. See Kevin M. Swartout, Martie P. Thompson, Mary P. Koss & Nan Su, What Is the Best 
Way to Analyze Less Frequent Forms of Violence? The Case of Sexual Aggression, 5 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 
305 (2015). 
178. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708. 
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In addition, variability in census tract population is accounted for through use 
of an exposure variable, or offset, that reflects the number of households per census 
tract. Use of the exposure variable enables an analysis of rates instead of counts.179 




0 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘'()* 																																								(4) 
 
where “the exposure variable, ln(n), is assigned a fixed coefficient of 1, and the 
negative binomial regression is transformed into an analysis of rates.”180 In this case, 
the exposure variable is the natural logarithm of the number of households per 
census tracts. 
I use the spatstat package in R to fit the negative binomial regression model 
to the data.181 In addition to the two variables of interest—census tract vacancy 
rates (2010) and the percent change in gross median rent (2010–2017)—the model 
includes four additional variables that may influence NMTC project citing patterns. 
The additional variables include census tract median gross income (2010), census 
tract Black population (2010), the change in census tract white population  
(2010–2017), and the change in census tract median gross income (2010–2017). 
These variables are potentially relevant since resident demographics may constitute 
alternate drivers for investment decisions in addition to the economic variables 
studied here. The purpose of this analysis is to produce regression estimates of the 
relative strength of vacancy rates and rent change, controlling for possible effects 
of race and income. 
2. Results 
As this Subsection will explain, the negative binomial regression analysis 
provides further evidence that vacancy rates and rent change are predictive of 
NMTC allocation patterns in many cities. In over half of the cities studied (thirteen 
of twenty), vacancy rate or rent change was the largest statistically significant 
predictor of NMTC allocations. Rent change was the strongest statistically 
significant predictor in seven cities: Cleveland, Columbus, Jackson, New Orleans, 
New York, Philadelphia, and Phoenix. Vacancy rate was the strongest statistically 
significant predictor in six cities: Baltimore, Cincinnati, Denver, Los Angeles, 
Louisville, and St. Louis. 
In negative binomial regressions, as in general Poisson point process models, 
coefficients reflect the amount by which the logs of expected project counts are 
expected to change with every unit change in the explanatory variable.182 For this 
 
179. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708. 
180. Id. at 709 (emphasis omitted). 
181. The R code for this step is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/gp6ndv02rw2f9rrf2idd 
66tnh2o0n9su [https://perma.cc/B4A5-GDLH]. 
182. Poisson Regression, Stata Annotated Output, UCLA INST. DIGIT. RSCH. & EDUC., https:/
/stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/output/poisson-regression/#:~:text=We%20can%20interpret%20the%20 
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reason, coefficients are typically interpreted by exponentiating the values, where 
(exp(b) – 1)*100 = percent change in count per unit change in the explanatory 
variable.183 For example, the rent change coefficient for New York City (b = 1.764) 
is interpreted as stating that, controlling for the other explanatory variables in the 
model, for every unit change in rent increase, the percent of NMTC allocations 
increases by (e1.764 – 1)*100 = (5.836 – 1)*100 = 483.57%. This means that, in New 
York City, the density of NMTC allocations is exponentially increasing as a function 
of rent change. Tables 4–7 report the results of the negative binomial regression 
analysis for each region. 
  
 
Poisson,the%20model%20are%20held%20constant [https://perma.cc/JZ7C-4DRP] ( last visited  
Oct. 6, 2021). 
183. Hao Wang, Interpret Poisson Regression Coefficient, HAO WANG, http://haowang.pw/
blog/Poisson-Coefficient-Interpretation/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/TRT2-4FW5]; 
PAUL ROBACK & JULIE LEGLER, BEYOND MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION: APPLIED 
GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS AND MULTILEVEL MODELS IN R ch. 4 ( 2021) (ebook), https://
bookdown.org/roback/bookdown-bysh/ch-poissonreg.html [https://perma.cc/D9VD-UDN7]. 
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  Northeast 
  Boston  New York 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change -0.791 0.756   1.764 0.505 *** 
Vacancy Rate 0.037 0.034   0.063 0.020 *** 
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 ** 
Black Population -0.002 0.007   0.005 0.005  
White Population 
Change 
0.043 0.023 *  -0.005 0.012  
Median Income 
Change 
<0.001 <0.001 *  <0.001 <0.001  
Chi-Square Test 0.901  1 
      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
  Northeast (continued) 
  Philadelphia  Pittsburgh 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change 3.025 0.970 ***  1.598 1.033  
Vacancy Rate 0.041 0.029   0.040 0.030  
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Black Population -0.003 0.007   0.001 0.010  
White Population Change 0.028 0.024   0.037 0.029  
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Chi-Square Test 1  0.996 
      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression of NMTC Allocations in 
Northeast Cities by Census Tract Rent Change (2010–2017), Vacancy 
Rate (2010), Median Gross Income (2010), Black Population (2010), 
White Population Change (2010–2017), and Median Gross Income 
Change (2010–2017) 
 
Table 4 shows that in the Northeast cities, rent increase was the strongest 
statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two of the four cities, New 
York and Philadelphia. In New York, high vacancy rates were also a statistically 
significant predictor of NMTC projects. These results are consistent with the results 
of the quadrat density analysis, and they provide further evidence that NMTC 
investment in the Northeast has occurred in areas that exhibit signs of 
gentrification. However, in Boston, where the spatial patterns reflected in the 
quadrat analyses were less conclusive, the regression analysis showed no statistically 
significant relationships between project counts and rent change or vacancy rates. 
In that city, demographic characteristics were stronger predictors. Finally, no 
statistically significant predictors were observed in Pittsburgh. Reasons for this 
variation will be considered in Part III below. 
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  Midwest 
  Chicago  Cincinnati 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change -0.715 0.843   0.133 1.199  
Vacancy Rate 0.031 0.020   0.084 0.022 *** 
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001 *  <0.001 <0.001  
Black Population 0.001 0.005   -0.010 0.011  
White Population Change -0.004 0.017   0.030 0.024  
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Chi-Square Test 1  0.988 
      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
  Midwest (continued) 
  Cleveland  Columbus 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change 2.133 1.065 **  1.471 0.770 * 
Vacancy Rate -0.008 0.026   0.071 0.021 *** 
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Black Population <0.001 0.007   0.007 0.010  
White Population Change 0.006 0.026   0.073 0.029 ** 
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 *** 
Chi-Square Test 0.993  1 
     *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
  Midwest (continued) 
  Minneapolis  St. Louis 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change 0.856 1.556   0.102 0.927  
Vacancy Rate 0.030 0.040   0.035 0.019 * 
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Black Population 0.024 0.019   0.008 0.008  
White Population Change -0.005 0.028   -0.037 0.025  
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 *** 
Chi-Square Test 0.653  0.220 
      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
  Midwest (continued) 
  Milwaukee   
Explanatory 
Variable 
 b SE p     
Rent Change 0.049 1.766      
Vacancy Rate 0.026 0.032      
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001      
Black Population -0.006 0.007      
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White Population Change 0.004 0.024      
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001      
Chi-Square Test 0.869   
       *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression of NMTC Allocations in Midwest 
Cities by Census Tract Rent Change (2010–2017), Vacancy Rate (2010), 
Median Gross Income (2010), Black Population (2010), White Population 
Change (2010–2017), and Median Gross Income Change (2010–2017) 
 
Table 5 shows that in the Midwest cities, rent increase was the strongest 
statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two of the seven cities, 
Cleveland and Columbus, both of which are located in Ohio. In addition, vacancy 
rates were the strongest statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two 
cities, Cincinnati and St. Louis. These results are consistent with the patterns 
observed in the quadrat density analysis, and they provide further evidence that in 
many Midwest cities, NMTC investment has flowed to areas that exhibit signs of 
gentrification. However, in the remaining three cities—Chicago, Minneapolis, and 
Milwaukee—no variable was a strong, statistically significant predictor of NMTC 
project counts. Reasons for this variation will be explored in Part III. 
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  South 
  Baltimore  Louisville 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change -0.046 0.564   -2.242 1.980  
Vacancy Rate 0.085 0.018 ***  0.104 0.052 ** 
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Black Population -0.020 0.008 **  -0.020 0.016  
White Population Change 0.043 0.024 *  0.030 0.046  
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Chi-Square Test 1  0.974 
      ***p<0.01; **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
  South (continued) 
  New Orleans  Jackson 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change 1.304 0.658 **  5.728 2.658 ** 
Vacancy Rate 0.039 0.020 *  0.083 0.055  
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Black Population 0.003 0.010   -0.003 0.030  
White Population Change 0.022 0.019   0.032 0.077  
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Chi-Square Test 0.451  0.241 
      ***p<0.01; **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression of NMTC Allocations in 
Southern Cities by Census Tract Rent Change (2010–2017), Vacancy Rate 
(2010), Median Gross Income (2010), Black Population (2010), White 
Population Change (2010–2017), and Median Gross Income Change 
(2010–2017) 
Table 6 shows that in the four Southern cities studied, rent increase was the 
strongest statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two cities, New 
Orleans and Jackson. In the other two cities, Baltimore and Louisville, vacancy rate 
was the strongest statistically significant predictor. These results are consistent with 
the patterns observed in the quadrat density analysis, and they provide further 
evidence that in the South, NMTC investment has flowed to areas that exhibit signs 
of gentrification. 
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  West 
  Denver  Los Angeles 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change 1.230 1.054   -0.097 0.582  
Vacancy Rate 0.171 0.046 ***  0.056 0.032 * 
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Black Population -0.019 0.016   0.007 0.008  
White Population Change 0.031 0.016 **  -0.007 0.010  
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Chi-Square Test 1  1 
      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
  West (continued) 
  Phoenix  Portland 
Variable  b SE p  b SE p 
Rent Change 2.220 0.803 ***  0.695 1.103  
Vacancy Rate 0.078 0.032 **  0.061 0.050  
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001  
Black Population 0.038 0.030   0.117 0.035 *** 
White Population Change -0.022 0.017   -0.059 0.034 * 
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 *** 
Chi-Square Test 0.993  0.604 
      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
  West (continued) 
  Seattle   
Variable  b SE p     
Rent Change 1.681 1.051      
Vacancy Rate 0.035 0.065      
Median Gross Income <0.001 <0.001      
Black Population 0.005 0.035      
White Population Change 0.016 0.039      
Median Income Change <0.001 <0.001      
Chi-Square Test 0.004   
        *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of NMTC Allocations in Western 
Cities by Census Tract Rent Change (2010–2017), Vacancy Rate (2010), 
Median Gross Income (2010), Black Population (2010), White Population 
Change (2010–2017), and Median Gross Income Change (2010–2017) 
 
Table 7 shows that in the five Western cities studied, vacancy rates were the 
strongest statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two cities, Denver 
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and Los Angeles. In a third city, Phoenix, rent change was the strongest statistically 
significant predictor. These results, which are consistent with the quadrat density 
analyses, provide further evidence that in many Western cities, NMTC investment 
has flowed to areas that exhibit signs of gentrification. However, in two Northwest 
cities, Portland and Seattle, neither vacancy rates nor rent increase were statistically 
significant predictors of NMTC projects. In Portland, higher Black populations 
were predictive of NMTC investment. No variable was a statistically significant 
predictor of NMTC investment in Seattle. The implications of this cross-city 
variation will be explored in Part III. 
Notably, the demographic variables studied (median gross income, Black 
population, white population change, and change in median gross income) were not 
significantly correlated to increasing NMTC project density in most cities. With the 
exception of Baltimore and Portland, where the percentage of Black residents had 
a small but statistically significant positive correlation with project density, the 
percentage of Black residents was not a significant predictor of NMTC projects. 
This result may reflect the fact that eligible census tracts have relatively similar racial 
demographics, particularly in segregated cities. 
In addition, the change in white population was not a statistically significant 
variable in fifteen of the twenty cities studied. The exceptions included four  
cities—Boston, Baltimore, Columbus, and Denver—where an increase in white 
population was a statistically significant predictor of NMTC allocations.184 In 
contrast, in one city—Portland—project counts had a statistically significant 
negative correlation with change in white population, suggesting that the frequency 
of NMTC allocations declined as white population increased. In that city, the 
strongest statistically significant predictor of allocations was the 2010  
Black population. 
Though these findings may appear to contradict this Article’s conclusions that 
NMTC project allocations have flowed to areas that exhibit signs of gentrification, 
it is worth noting that demographic change is often excluded from gentrification 
models since it is an unreliable indicator of the gentrification process.185 Hammel 
and Wyly note that “changes in racial composition do not appear to be applicable 
for the majority of gentrified neighborhoods” and “racial change is not an essential 
feature of the gentrification process.”186 
Perhaps more surprisingly, neither 2010 median gross income nor the change 
in median gross income from 2010–2017 appears to play a meaningful role in 
NMTC allocation patterns. Once again, at first blush, this result appears 
inconsistent with the larger prediction that NMTC allocations may cluster in areas 
 
184. In Boston, the increase in white population was a stronger predictor of NMTC allocations 
in Boston than either vacancy rates or rent change. In Baltimore, Columbus, and Denver, where vacancy 
rates and/or rent change were significant predictors, an increase in white population was also a 
significant predictor of NMTC allocations. 
185. See, e.g., Hammel & Wyly, supra note 32, at 256. 
186. Id. 
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experiencing gentrification. However, it is also possible that relevant changes in 
income are not captured in the sample due to the time period studied. Another 
possibility is that market conditions, such as the availability of undervalued vacant 
properties, are more salient and relevant to investment decisions than  
demographic characteristics. 
III. TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study provides evidence that, in many cities, federal NMTC subsidies 
have flowed disproportionately to eligible census tracts that exhibit signs of 
gentrification: high vacancy rates and increasing rent. The quadrat density analysis 
revealed that, in most cities, NMTC project density was highest in parts of the city 
that had high vacancy rates, increasing rents, or both. The results of the negative 
binomial regression analysis confirmed that, in many cities, high vacancy rates or 
rent increases were statistically significant predictors of NMTC investment. 
Together, these results provide new evidence that gentrifying census tracts may 
draw tax-subsidized investment away from other eligible areas. 
These findings have important implications for the federal NMTC program, 
which was recently expanded by the Consolidated Appropriations Act to authorize 
five billion dollars of tax credit allocations per year from 2020 to 2025.187 As this 
Section will explain, the finding that NMTC investment has flowed to areas that 
exhibit signs of gentrification suggests that the law may be operating inefficiently 
in many cities. In addition, these findings suggest that the law may produce 
inequitable outcomes despite its stated purpose to benefit low-income 
communities. Finally, the findings raise important questions about how the federal 
tax incentive is administered. 
Furthermore, these efficiency, equity, and administration implications are not 
limited to the NMTC program. First, the critiques raised here are also relevant to 
state-level NMTC programs, most of which use the federal NMTC as a model for 
similar tax credit programs administered at the state level. In other words, if the 
federal NMTC incentive is inefficient, inequitable, and poorly administered, many 
state-level NMTC programs will suffer from the same problems. Second, these 
findings are relevant to predict and evaluate the new Opportunity Zones law. As 
explained above, gentrifying census tracts are among the designated opportunity 
zones in many cities. Critics fear that those gentrifying tracts will draw investment 
away from other eligible census tracts, and this study provides evidence to support 
that prediction. 
Before discussing the implications, two points are worth noting. First, this 
study’s findings are somewhat surprising in the context of the NMTC, which 
includes safeguards that one might expect to reduce the frequency of investment in 
gentrifying areas. Other place-based tax incentives, including the Opportunity 
 
187. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 112 (2020);  
I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(H). 
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Zones law, lack such safeguards and include incentives that may make investment 
in gentrifying areas particularly attractive. All place-based tax incentives should be 
examined and, if necessary, reformed to ensure that they contain features to reduce 
the likelihood that the subsidies will flow to gentrifying areas. Failure to do so may 
have devastating consequences for low-income communities given the large size of 
the program. 
Second, this study’s findings suggest that resident demographics do not 
consistently predict NMTC investment patterns, even as other indicators of 
gentrification—high vacancy rates and rent increases—do predict NMTC 
investment. This is an important finding because it suggests that a myopic focus on 
race and income demographics as criteria to evaluate tax incentive investment 
patterns may be misplaced. When assessing outcomes of place-based tax incentives, 
researchers and policymakers should pay close attention to economic indicators of 
gentrification, such as those used in this study. Failure to do so may produce overly 
optimistic evaluations of tax incentive programs that are, in fact, inefficiently and 
inequitably flowing to gentrifying areas. 
With these two big-picture points in mind, this Part begins by explaining the 
efficiency, equity, and administrative implications of this study for federal and state 
NMTC programs. Next, it explores the further implications of this study for the 
Opportunity Zones program and other place-based tax incentive programs. 
A. Implications for the New Markets Tax Credit 
This study has provided evidence that NMTC investors have chosen to invest 
in locations that exhibit signs of gentrification. As this Section will explain, these 
findings have important efficiency, equity, and administrative implications for the 
NMTC. First, these findings suggest that NMTC inefficiently subsidizes 
inframarginal investment and that it inefficiently subsidizes investment in areas 
where investment is already taking place. Second, these findings suggest that the 
NMTC may reduce vertical equity within the tax system without increasing equitable 
outcomes outside the tax system. Third, these findings suggest that the CDFI Fund, 
which administers the NMTC program, has failed to consistently direct allocations 
to the most distressed neighborhoods. 
1. Efficiency of the NMTC 
This study’s findings suggest that the NMTC may be an inefficient subsidy in 
at least two respects. First, disproportionate investment in gentrifying areas may 
reflect investment decisions driven by market conditions and profit potential. While 
public investment almost certainly plays a role in initiating and accelerating 
gentrification,188 many gentrifying investments are market driven.189 When capital 
begins to flow to places with high profit potential—a precondition for 
 
188. See Zuk et al., supra note 23. 
189. Smith, supra note 117. 
Clean Final Edit_Layser_V2.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:16 AM 
212 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:163 
gentrification190—economies-of-scale and agglomeration economies may generate 
an additional “locational dynamic in which new production tends to be drawn to 
existing production locations.”191 In other words, market dynamics in gentrifying 
areas may be attractive to investors even without tax subsidies. 
Accordingly, the spatial patterns described in this Article may reflect 
investments driven primarily by market conditions. If this explanation is correct, 
this would suggest that a meaningful amount of federal NMTC program costs 
subsidize inframarginal investment that would have occurred without the 
incentive.192 The purpose of place-based tax incentives like the NMTC is to 
promote investment in places where it would not have occurred without  
a subsidy.193 
Subsidizing activity that would have occurred without the incentive is 
inefficient and contrary to sound tax policy at both federal and state levels.194 When 
a tax incentive “rewards a producer for production in which he would have engaged 
anyway . . . the government has acted inefficiently by giving up revenue without 
inducing more activity.”195 In the context of the NMTC, such inefficiencies are not 
limited to the federal law. Thirteen state governments supplement the federal 
incentive with state-level NMTC programs, and two states (California and 
Minnesota) have proposed NMTC legislation.196 Under some state NMTC laws, 
Community Development Entities (CDEs) are eligible for the tax credits only after 
entering into an allocation agreement with the CDFI Fund.197 As a result, federal 
NMTC allocations that subsidize inframarginal investment may have the 
downstream effect of introducing inefficiencies to state-level incentive programs. 
Second, these findings suggest that the NMTC is inefficient because it fails to 
target places that are likely to produce the greatest public benefit. Place-based tax 
incentives like the NMTC can be justified as policies that improve places for the 
benefit of low-income residents.198 However, if a place is already in the process of 
improving, then a public subsidy is not necessary. The NMTC statute refers to 
equity investments for “targeted populations” within “low-income 




191. DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: A THEORY OF UNEVEN 
GEOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT (2006). 
192. See Zuk et al., supra note 23. 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 
TEX. L. REV. 973, 992 (1985). 
196. State NMTC Programs, supra note 29. 
197. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 663/5 (2008) (defining “qualified community  
development entity”). 
198. See generally Layser, supra note 43 (explaining that ideally, place-based tax incentives would 
improve places for the benefit of residents who live there). 
199. I.R.C. § 45D(e)(2). 
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Gentrifying neighborhoods do not need public subsidies because they are 
already in transition. Therefore, to the extent that NMTC subsidies have 
disproportionately benefited gentrifying neighborhoods, the law has failed to 
promote neighborhood improvements that are not otherwise taking place. This 
problem is distinct from the question of whether a particular project would have 
proceeded but for the subsidy. Even marginal investment may be wasteful if there 
is no justification for subsidizing new investment in a particular place. 
A more efficient law would narrowly target neighborhoods with a specific 
need for place-based investment. The appropriate target for place-based investment 
depends on the specific objective of the law.200 However, at a minimum, the 
geographic scope of a development incentive should exclude places that are already 
in the process of gentrification. To be sure, this guideline presents challenges for 
lawmakers, particularly on the federal level. 
Defining and identifying gentrifying areas has long eluded academics. The 
difficulty “stems not only from the complexity of the process, but also from the 
difficulty of observing and measuring the phenomenon.”201 For this reason, many 
scholars “eschew census data in favor of intensive field surveys or other qualitative 
methods to document inner-city reinvestment.”202 However, on the federal level, 
field studies are not a practical basis for legislating the geographic scope of  
an incentive. 
Nevertheless, census data can be used as an imperfect proxy. For example, a 
statute may exclude census tracts where rent is increasing more quickly than the city 
average. In the case of tax incentives like the NMTC, which are administered 
through a competitive application process, the application procedures may include 
an inquiry into the income and rent trajectory of proposed project sites. Proposals 
for projects in neighborhoods that exhibit signs of gentrification should be rejected. 
Such procedures would reduce the likelihood that the tax incentives subsidize 
investments in neighborhoods that do not need them. 
2. Equity Impact of the NMTC 
The fact that the NMTC has disproportionately flowed to gentrifying 
neighborhoods also suggests that the NMTC may have inequitable outcomes. As 
this section will explain, the inequity derives from two sources. First, the NMTC 
violates vertical equity principles by providing tax preferences to high-income 
taxpayers, thereby undermining progressivity within the tax system. Second, the 
incentive probably does not deliver sufficient nontax benefits to low-income 
taxpayers to offset the “cost” of lost vertical equity within the tax system. 
Tax incentives like the NMTC reduce vertical equity by lowering the tax 
burden on high-income taxpayers without providing comparable relief to  
 
200. Layser, supra note 18. 
201. Hammel & Wyly, supra note 32, at 248. 
202. Id. 
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lower-income taxpayers. In tax theory, vertical equity is the principle that tax 
burdens should be distributed according to their ability to pay.203 In other words, to 
maintain vertical equity, higher-income taxpayers must pay more in taxes than 
lower-income taxpayers. Place-based incentives like the NMTC provide tax relief to 
high-income taxpayers—individuals or institutional—in order to induce them to 
direct their own capital toward redevelopment efforts. For this reason, place-based 
tax incentives like the NMTC apparently violate the vertical equity principle.204 
However, what is lost in vertical equity within the tax system may be justified 
if these tax laws advance economic and social equity outside the tax system. One 
early commenter stated that Congress intended each party of an NMTC transaction 
to serve “as a mere conduit to the delivery of equity capital to existing low-income 
community residents.”205 To the extent that the taxpayers who claim the tax credits 
on their tax returns do, in fact, serve as mere conduits to pass benefits along to  
low-income residents, the incidence of the tax benefit may fall on low-income 
taxpayers. Incidence refers to the person or persons who are “actually made better 
off on account of the tax provision.”206 If the incidence of the NMTC falls entirely 
on low-income taxpayers, then a distributional analysis focused on who claims the 
benefit on their tax returns will be misleading.207 
There is no theoretical or practical reason to think that all of the benefits of 
the NMTC program should flow to low-income residents. Rather, there is strong 
evidence that industry participants capture a share of the benefits.208 Indeed, 
without a real economic benefit to these parties, there would be little reason for 
them to participate in NMTC transactions, and the entire incentive program would 
fail. An open question is how much benefit do low-income residents derive from the 
NMTC program, and does it outweigh the loss of vertical equity? If the answer is 
“not much,” then the incentives may be mere “giveaways to rent-seeking special 
interests and bad federal policy.”209 
While this study cannot answer the question of how much the NMTC benefits 
low-income residents, it does provide evidence that the subsidy flows to 
communities that are experiencing gentrification. This raises at least two  
equity-related questions. The first is whether low-income residents benefit from the 
gentrification process—a topic of much debate in the literature. If low-income 
residents do not benefit from the gentrification process (or worse, if they are 
harmed by it) then tax incentives that disproportionately flow to gentrifying 
 
203. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19  
U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952). 
204. Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1996). 
205. Groves, supra note 73, at 221. 
206. Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 19 
(2011). 
207. Id. 
208. Michael Eickhoff & Steve Carter, Accessing Capital Through the New Markets Tax Credit 
Program, J. STATE TAX’N, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 17. 
209. Sugin, supra note 206, at 6. 
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neighborhoods may produce inequitable outcomes, particularly if they contribute to 
or accelerate the gentrification process. 
It is possible that gentrification provides economic, political, and social 
benefits to low-income residents.210 Such benefits may include “expanding 
employment opportunities,” improved “shopping for low-income people,” the 
creation of “an urban political fora in which affluent and poor citizens must deal 
with each other’s priorities in a democratic process,” and reduced social isolation of 
low-income African Americans.211 If true, then tax incentives that contribute to the 
gentrification process may advance economic, socioeconomic, and racial equality. 
These equality gains outside the tax system would potentially justify the loss in 
vertical tax equity. 
However, it is also possible that these benefits to low-income residents who 
remain in gentrifying neighborhoods may be outweighed by harm to those who are 
displaced. Gentrification research is inconclusive as to whether the gentrification 
process results in widespread displacement.212 On the one hand, the research 
“consistently shows that rent appreciation predicts displacement” and that  
“out-movers are more likely to be renters, poorer, and people of color than  
in-movers.”213 On the other hand, researchers have also found that “[a]lthough 
displacement was significantly related to gentrification, the substantive size of this 
relationship is very small” and “poor renters do not appear to be especially 
susceptible to displacement.”214 
In fact, the apparent stability of gentrifying neighborhoods may be 
independent evidence that low-income residents do benefit from neighborhood 
improvement. As mentioned previously, some researchers have proposed that the 
unexpected stability may reflect the fact that “the normal neighborhood turnover 
process slows in neighborhood that are gaining new amenities.”215 Others have 
echoed this hypothesis, stating that “[t]he most plausible explanation for this 
surprising finding is that gentrification brings with it neighborhood improvements 
that are valued by disadvantaged households, and they consequently make greater 
efforts to remain in their dwelling units, even if the proportion of their income 
devoted to rent rises.”216 
On the other hand, the inconclusive evidence of displacement may simply 
reflect methodological challenges associated with gentrification research. 
Researchers have long noted that tracking displacement is “a massive undertaking 
 
210. J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405 (2003). 
211. Id. at 419–22. Byrne’s essay and others like it drew sharp criticism from scholars who 
objected to a general turn in the gentrification literature that downplayed the potential for gentrification 
to harm low-income residents through displacement. See also Tom Slater, The Eviction of Critical 
Perspectives from Gentrification Research, 30 INT’L J. URB. REG’L RSCH. 737 (2006). 
212. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 37. 
213. Id. 
214. Freeman, supra note 30, at 480. 
215. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 37. 
216. Freeman & Braconi, supra note 131, at 51. 
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. . . if indeed it [is] possible at all.”217 Others have echoed this sentiment, observing 
that “it is difficult to find people who have been displaced, particularly if those 
people are poor.”218 Compounding this problem, “quantitative analyses have 
systematically failed to characterize the various stages of gentrification,” thereby 
leaving out “the potential for gentrification-related displacement to precede 
gentrification, especially when property owners attempt to vacate units in 
anticipation of rising rents and neighborhood change.”219 
Given the uncertainty, it is difficult to evaluate whether tax incentives that 
flow to gentrifying areas promote equality outside the tax system, thereby justifying 
the reduction in vertical tax equity. However, a second equity consideration is more 
easily analyzed. Even if we assume that gentrification benefits low-income residents, 
the equity gains associated with accelerating gentrification probably are not greater 
than the potential equity gains associated with improving distressed neighborhoods 
that are otherwise declining or stagnant. Arguably, residents of a non-gentrifying 
neighborhood have more to gain from tax-induced improvements than residents of 
neighborhoods that have already begun to improve. 
As such, the strongest case for using place-based tax incentives, despite their 
detrimental impact on vertical equity, is to promote equality in areas that are not 
gentrifying.220 The results of this study suggest that the NMTC law has failed to 
target such areas. More equitable outcomes could be achieved through statutory or 
administrative reforms that reduce the frequency by which NMTC allocations are 
directed to gentrifying neighborhoods. 
3. Administration of the NMTC 
The results of this study have shown that NMTC investment has 
disproportionately flowed to areas that exhibit signs of gentrification, despite the 
fact that the program is actively administered by the CDFI Fund. It is worth noting 
that the CDFI Fund probably plays at least some role in influencing siting patterns 
of NMTC projects. The CDFI Fund uses its own set of screening criteria when 
weighing tax credit applications. For example, the CDFI Fund considers whether 
food-service projects are targeted to food deserts or whether medical facility 
projects are targeted to medically underserved areas.221 It also gives special weight 
to projects located in areas designated as “severely distressed.”222 
Nevertheless, this study found that in many cities, NMTC allocations have 
tended to cluster in areas that exhibit signs of gentrification. In addition, this study 
 
217. Slater, supra note 211, at 748. 
218. Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and 
Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. STUD. 23 (2006). 
219. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 37. 
220. See generally Layser, supra note 18, for a discussion of how place-based tax incentives can 
promote equality in distressed places by reducing geographic inequality. 
221. CDFI Fund, supra note 76. 
222. Id. 
Clean Final Edit_Layser_V2.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:16 AM 
2021] SUBSIDIZING GENTRIFICATION 217 
revealed significant variations across cities. Both of these findings raise questions 
about the role of the CDFI Fund, which administers the program nationally.223 
Because the NMTC is centrally administered, one might expect spatial patterns to 
be similar across geographies. Variation in the patterns may reflect a limit to the 
agency’s capacity to influence the location of tax-subsidized investment. 
One likely explanation relates to the realities of the allocation process itself. I 
spoke to several CDE professionals with familiarity with the application process.224 
Though some indicated that the chances of a successful application were highest 
when a specific project pipeline could be described in the application, several 
indicated that the projects described in the application are not necessarily the same 
as those that are ultimately funded.225 A reason for this disparity is the time lag 
between identifying projects—which are real projects in need of funding—and the 
receipt of NMTC allocations after an application process that can take six months 
or more. By the time the allocations are received, the pipeline projects may no longer 
exist. At that point, the CDE must work to identify new projects and distribute the 
allocation before it expires. These new projects may be similar to those described 
in the application, but they are not the same—and may not be in the same  
places—as the ones reviewed by the CDFI Fund. 
Another explanation for the regional variation is that the preferences of 
investors, CDEs, and other stakeholders outweigh the preferences of the CDFI 
Fund in some cities. Another possibility is that state-level NMTC laws (or the 
absence thereof) may impact siting patterns. Further research into the role of  
state-level NMTC laws and their relationship to federal incentives could help 
understand the limits on the CDFI Fund’s capacity to shape tax incentive program 
outcomes. To the extent that the CDFI Fund is simply unable to influence siting 
patterns, recommendations that rely on more active administration of the NMTC 
may fail to improve outcomes. Instead, statutory amendments may be necessary to 
specifically exclude gentrifying areas from eligibility. 
B. Predicting the Impact of Opportunity Zones 
This study has demonstrated that when gentrifying tracts are included within 
the scope of eligible census tracts, they may serve as magnets to attract investment 
away from other areas. The new Opportunity Zones law may be particularly 
susceptible to this result—even more than the NMTC. The reasons are twofold. 
 
223. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 1. 
224. Data is confidential per the terms of Institutional Review Board approval. Transcripts on 
file with author. 
225. When CDEs apply for NMTC allocations, their application describes a pipeline of projects 
to be funded through the tax credits. However, the CDE is not required to fund the specific projects 
described in the application; the projects that are ultimately funded only need to be consistent with 
those approved by the CDFI Fund. For example, assume a CDE represents to the CDFI Fund that it 
will use its allocations to fund a hospital project, and it describes a specific project in its application. If 
the CDE receives an allocation, it may use those tax credits to fund a different hospital that was not 
specifically described in the application. See id. 
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First, the Opportunity Zones law lacks active administration comparable to the 
competitive allocation process used to administer the NMTC. As a result, the 
Opportunity Zones program lacks a potentially moderating regulatory force. The 
results of this study showed that even with a competitive application process, 
investment tended to cluster in areas with high vacancy rates and increasing rental 
rates. Such patterns are likely to be even more visible in the context of Opportunity 
Funds, which are not subject to comparable regulatory oversight. 
Second, Opportunity Zone investments are more likely to be profit driven 
than NMTC investment. The NMTC attracts a reasonably high number of 
nonprofit and social-benefit minded investors that may not be motivated solely by 
profit.226 In fact, “most NMTC investments do not generate significant economic 
return.”227 Instead, NMTC investors, which are almost always large financial 
institutions, are motivated by a combination of regulatory benefits and financial 
returns derived from the tax credits themselves.228 These types of investors do not 
need to maximize profits by investing in gentrifying areas. 
In contrast, the Opportunity Zones law overwhelmingly rewards  
profit-motivated investors that are more likely than NMTC investors to actively 
seek profit opportunities in gentrifying areas.229 The primary benefit of investing in 
Opportunity Zones is capital gains relief,230 which is most valuable to taxpayers 
whose assets have substantially appreciated. Because the law emphasizes high-profit 
investment, Opportunity Zones investors are likely to seek out the most profitable 
locations among eligible census tracts, including gentrifying tracts. 
For these reasons, the spatial patterns observed in this study are likely to be 
even more pronounced in the context of Opportunity Zones. This means that any 
inefficient patterns of NMTC investment likely foreshadow inefficiencies in 
Opportunity Zones investment as well. It also means that any inequities caused by 
these spatial patterns are likely to occur in the Opportunity Zones context. In fact, 
such inequities may arise on larger scale. Because the NMTC is a capped program, 
it is claimed by a limited number of taxpayers each year. From 2010 to 2019, 
Congress authorized $3.5 billion in NMTC allocations annually.231 From 2004 to 
2017, an average of 413 allocations were originated per year.232 
 
226. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 11. 
227. HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, supra note 77. 
228. Id. at 3 (explaining how leveraged structures are used to generate positive rates of return 
from the tax credit investment); OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FACT SHEET: NEW 
MARKET TAX CREDITS (2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/
community-affairs/community-developments-fact-sheets/ca-fact-sheet-new-markets-tax-credits-feb-
2016.html (click “Download PDF”) [https://perma.cc/5XYF-7AQA] (explaining that banks may 
receive credit under the Community Reinvestment Act for NMTC investments). 
229. Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 82, 133 (2020); see 
also supra Section I.A (explaining the relationship between gentrification and profitability). 
230. See supra Section II.B.2. 
231. Compare I.R.C. 45D(f)(1)(G) (authorizing $3.5 billion for years 2010–2019), with  
I.R.C. 45D(f)(1)(H) (raising the authorized amount to $5 billion for years 2020–2025). 
232. Id. 
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The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that the Opportunity Zones 
law will deliver a comparable amount, $3.5 billion, in capital gains relief each year 
through 2022.233 However, unlike the NMTC, which provides a single tax credit 
allocation to each CDE (claimed by investors over a seven-year period), the 
Opportunities Zones law authorizes a second phase of capital gains relief that is not 
captured by the Joint Committee on Taxation’s estimates.234 Opportunity Fund 
investors who hold their investments for ten years will receive an additional 
exclusion of any post-investment capital gains on their interest235—a benefit that 
may prove extremely valuable to high-income taxpayers and costly to  
the government. 
The capital gains relief provided by the Opportunity Zones law will be claimed 
almost exclusively by high-net-worth taxpayers. In 2012, well over half of capital 
gains were reported by individual taxpayers who had adjusted gross incomes of one 
million dollars or more.236 That same group was responsible for only 0.27% of tax 
returns,237 suggesting that a tiny percentage of taxpayers, comprised of some of the 
wealthiest Americans, have the greatest need to shelter capital gains in Opportunity 
Funds. For this reason, the Opportunity Zones law stands to violate vertical equity 
to a greater degree than the NMTC. Meanwhile, as explained above, it is also likely 
to result in clustering of investment in gentrifying areas. For these reasons, the 
Opportunity Zones law stands to be even more inequitable than the NMTC. 
To minimize inefficiencies and inequitable outcomes, designated Opportunity 
Zones should be audited, and gentrifying census tracts should be deemed ineligible 
for further Opportunity Fund investment. In addition, the tax incentive should be 
subject to active administrative oversight, whereby Opportunity Funds would be 
required to obtain preapproval for large investments. These safeguards would help 
ensure that gentrifying areas do not attract investment away from other Opportunity 
Zones, ultimately undermining program objectives. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided evidence that place-based tax incentives have flowed 
to gentrifying census tracts, even when non-gentrifying tracts were eligible for the 
same subsidies. Specifically, NMTC projects have been disproportionately located 
 
233. See Jacoby, supra note 28. 
234. See also Samantha Jacoby, Potential Flaws of Opportunity Zones Loom, as Do Risks of  
Large-Scale Tax Avoidance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES ( Jan. 11, 2019), https://
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scale-tax [https://perma.cc/5HWS-74MU]. 
235. See 26 U.S.C.§1400Z-2(c) (excluding all post-investment capital gains after ten years). 
236. SOI Tax Stats - Sales of Capital Assets Reported on Individual Tax Returns, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-sales-of-capital-assets-reported-on-
individual-tax-returns [https://perma.cc/RX2G-RZJZ] (May 14, 2021) (showing that 50.32% of  
short-term capital gains and 63.75% of long-term capital gains were reported by taxpayers with adjusted 
gross income above $1 million). 
237. Id. 
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in the eligible census tracts with the highest vacancy rates and increasing rental rates. 
These findings suggest that the federal NMTC program suffers from inefficiencies 
and violates equity principles, and they raise new questions about the role regulators 
have played in its administration. They also provide empirical support to critiques 
about the newer, larger Opportunity Zones tax incentive. Even a small number of 
Opportunity Zones in gentrifying census tracts may serve to undermine that 
program if investment flows disproportionately to those zones, as they have done 
in the context of the NMTC. For these reasons, statutory and administrative 
reforms are needed to ensure that place-based tax incentives benefit the 
neighborhoods that need them most. 
    
